UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ------------------------------x UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. 24 Cr. 542 (AS) SEAN COMBS, a/k/a "Puff Daddy," a/k/a "P. Diddy," a/k/a "Diddy," a/k/a "PD," a/k/a "Love," Defendant. Trial
New York, N.Y. May 19, 2025 8:35 a.m. Before: HON. ARUN SUBRAMANIAN, District Judge -and a Jury- APPEARANCES JAY CLAYTON United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York BY: MADISON R. SMYSER EMILY A. JOHNSON MAURENE R. COMEY MEREDITH FOSTER MITZI STEINER MARY C. SLAVIK Assistant United States Attorneys APPEARANCES
(Continued)
AGNIFILO INTRATER LLP Attorneys for Defendant BY: MARC A. AGNIFILO TENY R. GERAGOS -and- SHER TREMONTE BY: ANNA M. ESTEVAO -and- SHAPIRO ARATO BACH LLP BY: ALEXANDRA A.E. SHAPIRO JASON A. DRISCOLL -and- XAVIER R. DONALDSON BRIAN STEEL NICOLE WESTMORELAND ALSO PRESENT: LUCY GAVIN, AUSA Paralegal Specialist SHANNON BECKER, AUSA Paralegal Specialist RAYMOND MCLEOD, Defense Paralegal Specialist
(Trial resumed; jury not present)
THE COURT: I've reviewed the letters submitted overnight. Please be seated, everyone. I'll do the same thing that I've done previously, which is I'll give you my tentative rulings and then I'll hear the parties to see if there is anything that I've missed, and we can take it from there. First, as to Dawn Richard, concerning the objection to testimony concerning threats made by the defendant to Ms. Richard the day after the witness testifies she observed the defendant assault Ms. Ventura with the skillet is overruled. Whether or not the evidence would independently pass Rule 403 muster as to the charge in Count Two relating to Victim 1, the defense plainly opened the door to this testimony in opening statements. The court refers to the excerpt that is included in the government's letter from yesterday recounting Ms. Geragos' statements in the transcript, page 147. The government's May 18 letter identifies several other issues concerning Ms. Richard's testimony.
First, the government's letter addresses other instances where Ms. Richard witnessed acts of abuse against Ms. Ventura. As to those incidents that Ms. Richard witnessed, I take it there is no objection to the introduction of that testimony and none has been identified by the defense. However, the defense does object to subsequent discussions that Ms. Richard had with the defendant and Harve Pierre. The sum and substance which is recounted in the government's letter is that they told Ms. Richard to mind her own business concerning conversations that Ms. Richard had with Ms. Ventura. The court does not see the relevance and probative value of this kind of testimony, whether or not it would be admissible as not hearsay under Rule 801, and so it excludes on Rule 403 grounds, those discussions between the defendant and Harve Pierre and Ms. Richard. For the same reason, the court excludes evidence and testimony that when Ms.
Richard wanted to leave the Bad Boy label in 2011, the defendant and Mr. Pierre told her she can leave only if she agreed to keep things quiet, which according to the government's letter Ms. Richard understood was a reference to the abuse. That testimony is excluded on Rule 403 grounds as well. Just taking a step back, some portion of the testimony of all three of the witnesses addressed in the government's letters strikes me as a case built on gossip, as opposed to what witnesses actually saw or did or communications that would otherwise be admissible. And I think the defense makes a fair point that we have to police those lines, because under Rule 403, even if these statements would technically not be hearsay or would fit within an exception, Rule 403 is always applicable to judge the admissibility of that kind of testimony.
And for the reasons stated in the defense's letter from early this morning, absent a further proffer of relevance in admissibility, the evidence as to these two additional parts of Ms. Richard's testimony would be excluded. The government objects to the attention of defense Exhibits 1500 through 1519 on relevance grounds. That objection is overruled. The government does not challenge the admission of these materials on hearsay grounds, but rather raises what appears to be a Rule 403 objection. To the extent that Ms. Richard testifies about acts of violence and threats from the time period of 2009 through 2011, the defense is entitled to attempt to undermine her credibility by referencing later communications that show love and friendship, as opposed to fear and intimidation. Of course, the government will establish or try to establish that those friendly texts were the result of intimidation that Ms.
Richard felt based on things like the earlier incident in the recording studio the day after the skillet assault. However, the defense is entitled to suggest that those later communications are violative of the lack of credibility in Ms. Richard's testimony concerning the violence that took place. As to Ms. Morgan, the first issue concerns statements by Ms. Ventura to Ms. Morgan that the defendant controlled Ms. Ventura's career and that she could not break up with the defendant because he controlled her career. Those go directly to the defense's attacks on Ms. Ventura's credibility as to those issues in cross-examination and in opening statements, as the government points out in its May 18 letter. These statements are admissible as a prior consistent statement under 801(d)(1)(B). Ms.
Ventura's statements that she was scared of the defendant would be admissible under Rule 803(3) as a statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind and emotional condition, and they would be independently be admissible under 801(d)(1)(B). Ms. Ventura's statements that Ms. Morgan -- to Ms. Morgan that Mr. Combs physically assaulted her after she found out she was seeing Mr. Mescudi is offered not for the truth of the matter, but as context for testimony that, during this time, the defendant called Ms. Morgan incessantly. The court will exclude those statements on hearsay and Rule 403 grounds. The main import of that kind of testimony goes to the underlying statements that Ms. Ventura was actually physically assaulted. And so even technically it would be admissible and overcome a hearsay objection. The court would exclude that kind of testimony under Rule 403 grounds. As for Ms.
Ventura's statements concerning what happened to her at the InterContinental Hotel in 2016, same thing. The government offers that testimony for context for what subsequently happened at Ms. Morgan's apartment. These statements are unnecessary for Ms. Morgan's subsequent testimony, are plainly going to the truth of the matter and, in any event, would be excludable on Rule 403 grounds. For that reason, that testimony is excluded. Ms. Ventura's statements to Ms. Morgan that Ms. Ventura believed that the defendant had a tracker on her car are excluded on the same grounds, hearsay and Rule 403. Other issues in the defense's e-mails that is not addressed in the government's letter, but for the sake of completeness, any testimony from Ms. Morgan that Ms. Ventura's contract was a hostage contract and that the defendant was notorious for driving unfair bargains with artists is excluded under 403 grounds. Ms. Ventura's statements to Ms. Morgan that the defendant had Ms.
Ventura hold a gun for her at a club are excluded on the same basis. Ms. Morgan's opinions that the defendant controlled Ms. Ventura's career are excluded. So, just to clarify, to the extent that Ms. Ventura told Ms. Morgan that the defendant controlled her career, those statements related from Ms. Ventura to Ms. Morgan would be admissible for the reasons I specified. However, Ms. Morgan's opinions or views that the defendant controlled Ms. Ventura's career don't fit in the same bucket, and they are excluded. As to Mr. James, Ms. Ventura's statements that Mr. James -- to Mr. James that this life is crazy and that the defendant had too much control over her and that Ms. Ventura could not leave her relationship because of those things is admissible under 801(d)(1)(B) and 803(3) for the same reasons as the similar testimony would be admissible as offered by Ms. Morgan. Now, Mr. James' testimony concerning statements made by Genevieve Robles as to the defendant's assault of Ms.
Ventura in a car on the way home from a club in January 2009 is, absent a further foundation, inadmissible on hearsay and Rule 403 grounds. The court disagrees that this can be brought in just in terms of context. The government also offers that the statements would be admissible under 801(d)(2)(D), which covers statements against an opposing party made by the parties' agent or employee on a matter within the scope of the relationship. It's not clear how a statement by Ms. Robles to Mr. James concerning the defendant hitting Ms. Ventura on the way home from a club would be within the scope of Ms. Robles' employment or agency with the defendant. I'm happy to hear the government further on that issue, but I'm not seeing it based on the submission that's been made to date. Mr. James' testimony concerning statements made by Mr.
Bonds, who works in security, and Atkinson, who is a chef, to him concerning the defendant assaulting Atkinson would not seem to be statements made by these individuals within the scope of their employment or agency with the defendant. But, again, the government is permitted to try to lay a foundation for admission of that testimony. I'm happy to hear if there is further context that I'm missing as to that specific issue. Now, the testimony concerning Mr. Bonds telling James about Capricorn Clark having to take a lie detector test after the defendant's jewelry went missing, made after Mr. James found what he thought was a loose diamond, would seem to be within the bounds of Rule 801(d)(2)(D), given that Bonds is a security officer discussing a security matter that was plainly relevant to both his and Mr. James' employment, given that Mr. James had just found a diamond. I'm sure that the government will lay appropriate foundation to show that the exception applies and that this testimony would be coming in for a non-hearsay purpose. So I'll stop there because I think I've covered everything. Ms. Steiner.
MS. STEINER: Yes, your Honor. Thank you. With respect to your Honor's ruling about the two threat statements made by Ms. Richard, I did want to make a clarification, which I think I inartfully worded in my letter, which is where things got garbled.
THE COURT: That's OK. The letter came in very late, so...
MS. STEINER: Understood. Apologies for that. In the letter, we wrote that with respect to the earlier-in-time threat about Ms. Richard's attempts to intervene with Ms. Ventura after either incidents of abuse or to encourage her to get an independent career when the defendant was stating things to the contrary, we intended to write that Ms. -- the defendant would both be threatened by Mr. Combs and informed to mind her own business, so to speak. And, in fact, the mind your own business comment, I expect, if I were to ask her about it, would come primarily from Mr. Harve Pierre, if on direct the court permitted me to ask regarding the threats that were made by Mr. Combs. I expect she would state the exact same types of statements that were elicited with respect to the egg skillet incident, such as, I'm going to make you go missing. Similarly, she perceived kind of a threat to her life. To the extent that the court has ruled that the defense has opened the door because they stated in their opening that witnesses were not going to police, Ms. Richard will testify that it's because of the threats that she would go missing that the defendant made at that time that she did not continue to intervene with that abuse. So I fully take your Honor's point with respect to the later-in-time threat in 2011. I think they are -- Mr. Combs did not make a more specific threat, and it really is Ms. Richard's inference that would get us there. But with respect to the earlier-in-time threats about her intervention, they are much more specific.
THE COURT: Understood. So, just in a nutshell, the same brand of testimony that was objected to on Friday, is that what you're talking about?
MS. STEINER: Correct.
THE COURT: There is going to be testimony along those same lines, meaning Ms. Richard observed violence against Ms. Ventura after that. The defendant, referencing what she heard, what she saw, made threats against Ms. Richard --
MS. STEINER: Correct, your Honor.
THE COURT: -- to keep her quiet.
MS. STEINER: Correct, your Honor.
THE COURT: So that would be -- that would not fall within my ruling, so that would be permissible for the same reason as the incident in the recording studio.
MS. STEINER: Thank you, your Honor. Just to clarify, to really parse this with respect to Mr. Harve Pierre, I do expect she would say, as to his statements, that he would say, among other things, mind your own business, where are you going to go. And she inferred that to be maybe a less severe threat, but similarly a threat. Would that also fall within your Honor's ruling?
THE COURT: How do you overcome the hearsay objection as to Mr. Pierre? If he's working for Bad Boy Records and he's talking about Ms. Richard being quiet about things that she has seen, how does that fit within the scope of the agency relationship?
MS. STEINER: It's in furtherance of the conspiracy, your Honor. And also, he is acting, I expect she would testify, that she's acting in tandem with the defendant. So the defendant would come in and make threats, and then Mr. Pierre would essentially back up the defendant by making, perhaps, less extreme threats, but threats nonetheless.
THE COURT: Same thing. Even putting aside the fact that it's a coconspirator statement, it comes in for the same reason that the defense has put in issue, the fact that allegations of violence or hostile workplace are unfounded because nobody complained to the police. So they've opened the door to those statements coming in.
MS. STEINER: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: I'm just characterizing.
MS. STEINER: I thought that was a ruling.
THE COURT: Try to get the wins when you can get them. I'm just characterizing that. That's the submission?
MS. STEINER: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I think that is well taken. I think that if there were specific threats made relating to instances of violence by Mr. Combs against Ms. Ventura, which, I take it, you're saying that's what is going to come out in the testimony.
MS. STEINER: Correct.
THE COURT: Those would be admissible on the same basis.
MS. STEINER: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Ms. Slavik, we will turn to the defense.
MS. SLAVIK: Yes, your Honor. I wanted to address some of the issues that you raised with respect to David James, specifically the statements that the government seeks to admit through the employee exception. And those two statements, the statement of Ms. Robles with respect to the January 2009 assault and then the statements of Bonds and the chef with respect to the defendant's assault of the chef, those statements, the government submits, are admissible under the employee exception. And I just want to start by noting the liberal admissibility standard with respect to this particular exception.
I'm quoting from the Pappas case, a Second Circuit case that's cited in the government's MILs, but the Second Circuit encouraged liberal admissibility of statements under this exception because "an employee is usually the person best informed about certain acts committed in the course of his employment, and because while still employed an employee is unlikely to make damaging statements about his employer unless those statements are true." So, with that standard in mind, courts in this district have admitted things that have been described as private musings of employees. That's from a Judge Gardephe case, I believe. The In Re Reserve Fund Securities & Derivatives litigation. I think what's important here is understanding the scope of the employment relationship between the defendant and these individuals making statements. I expect that Mr. James will testify that being a personal assistant to the defendant was merely a 24/7 job.
Personal assistants were with the defendant from the time that he woke up to the time that he went to sleep. Often, that was 20 hours a day, sometimes more. Personal assistants were expected to be at his side at all times. At business meetings, at dinners, at club appearances, in the studio. At all times personal assistants were expected to be there with the defendant. The same is true for security. Security staff was with the defendant nearly at all times. And so the scope of that employment relationship is really quite broad, and these actions that we're discussing certainly fall within the scope of those individuals' employment. For instance, Ms. Robles was at the club with the defendant. She was working. This was part of her duty as a personal assistant to be with the defendant at the club, to be riding in the car with the defendant, security, and Ms. Ventura. So her witnessing this assault was certainly within the scope of her employment. And the statements that she made to Mr.
James were within the scope of that employment and during the duration of that employment. The other point on this is Ms. Robles' statements, and the whole event is kind of -- it's difficult to separate what Mr. James can testify about due to his direct personal knowledge. He can testify that that night, Mr. Combs burst into the home, made a beeline to Mr. James, and reviewed his browsing history because, according to the defendant, there was a blogger who was "lying about him," lying about the assault of Ms. Ventura. Immediately after that, Mr. James was asked by the defendant to deliver something to Ms. Ventura, who was staying at the London Hotel at the defendant's behest. So this incident and Ms. Robles' recording of this incident is really intermixed with the directives that the defendant provided to Mr. James personally. So I think that between the scope of Ms. Robles' employment and the directives that the defendant gave Mr. James in the context of his employment, I think these statements come in under the employee exception.
THE COURT: Don't we run into an issue here that, given what you've said about the scope of these individuals' employment, essentially anything that they said to each other would be admissible in your view under this exception, so we have a situation that, for an extended period of time, any witness can come on the stand and say, This person told me that this thing happened, this person told me that that thing happened? Even if it wouldn't be within the scope of a conventional employment relationship, in this case, it all comes in. My concern with that is that there are other ways to get this evidence in. For instance, Ms. Ventura testified as to the underlying incident here, right?
MS. SLAVIK: That's right.
THE COURT: So what Mr. James is adding is just the post script, meaning that after this happened, he was dispatched to the London Hotel to bring food to Ms. Ventura. He then saw someone from the security detail which answered the door, which he thought was unusual. The government is going to put those pieces together in closing argument to show that there was this incident of violence, and then she was in the London Hotel for an extended period of time. There was food brought to her, but the food was brought to someone from the security detail. And I take it the government will suggest that she was essentially held captive there after an incident of violence perpetrated by the defendant. So, now, I've explained how the pieces would be put together in a way where Mr. James would not have to testify about these statements coming in from other employees. What I'm suggesting is that it's a Rule 403 issue more than it might be an issue under Rule 801, if you get my drift.
MS. SLAVIK: I understand what you're saying, your Honor. And certainly the focus of his testimony is not going to be on Ms. Robles' statements. The government does not intend to spend a lot of time getting the description of Ms. Robles' recounting of this event. But I do think that it's important to establish that Mr. James was aware of this assault, not only because of what happened before, where the defendant bursts in and reviews Mr. James' search history, but also what happens after, which is that the defendant dispatches Mr. James to go to the hotel and to provide the food to Ms. Ventura. I think that that context of Ms. Robles' reporting that, what had happened at the club, I think that that's important to give context to what happened before with respect to Mr. James and what happened after with respect to Mr. James. I also think it's important to note that, you know, your Honor remarked that this is different from a traditional employment relationship. Maybe, you know, this sort of exception could apply to an employee making representations about a contract or something like that. That is very true. This is not, you know, necessarily a typical application. But I think that's reflective of this job not being a typical job, and I think that's what we have to focus on. I think that's what the Second Circuit directs us to focus on. The scope of that employment relationship and here, because the scope is so broad and involves so much of the defendant's personal life, I think these statements come in under that.
THE COURT: Understood. Let's hear from the defense.
MS. SLAVIK: I'm happy --
THE COURT: Did you have other issues?
MS. SLAVIK: Well, I think essentially for the same reasons, the statements by Bonds and the chef with respect to the defendant's assault of the chef, I think those statements are similarly situated in that both Bonds and the chef were employed by the defendant. The scope of that employment was broad, particularly for security. Security was with the defendant nearly 24/7. I expect the chef will testify that she worked extensively for the defendant as well. This particular incident took place while the chef was working in her capacity as a chef. I believe Mr. James will testify that the dispute was a result of the defendant's dissatisfaction with the chef's preparation of his eggs. And the timing is also, I think, important with respect to these statements. Mr. James shows up, you know, sort of midway through this altercation. He doesn't see the physical altercation himself, but immediately after, the defendant instructs him to go to the police station to file a police report. Mr. James obviously does not do that, and I think it's important for the context of Mr. James' actions and the directive to Mr. James that he hears from Mr. Bonds and from the chef what actually happened.
THE COURT: What's the relevance of this testimony?
MS. SLAVIK: Sorry?
THE COURT: What's the relevance of the testimony concerning the defendant telling Mr. James to file a police report and his refusal to do so? Can you connect the dots?
MS. SLAVIK: Yes. The relevance is the defendant seeking to obstruct his assault of the chef by asking Mr. James to file a false police report.
THE COURT: So, again, this would be relevant to what the defense opened the case on, which is that there is -- there was violence here, but people were -- people did not -- Well, this is a little bit different. He was actually told to go to the police, but just in a way that would be inconsistent with what he understood had actually happened.
MS. SLAVIK: That's right.
THE COURT: Again, tell me what the relevance is.
MS. SLAVIK: The relevance is the defendant's -- First of all, his consciousness of guilt. Secondly, it's the defendant's efforts to obstruct his -- the defendant's own criminal acts.
THE COURT: Understood. Anything else, Ms. Slavik?
MS. SLAVIK: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: Let me hear there the defense.
MR. AGNIFILO: Yes, your Honor. If I may, let me take a step back for a second. I'll deal --
THE COURT: Before you proceed, just so you know we're not burning the jury's time, I think one of the jurors might be just a few minutes late. So we've got a couple minutes.
MR. AGNIFILO: Great. Thank you, Judge. One thing, I know that when the witness on the stand was beginning her testimony, I lodged a few objections. I checked with the government on Saturday to see if the government would be OK with the fact that Ms. Westmoreland would be doing the cross of the current witness rather than myself, and they said they were fine with that. Although I raised some legal challenges, I think what sort of happened, it segued from your Honor's ruling into the examination. So, the government is OK with it. So, I know your Honor's individual rules would prefer we sort of stay one lawyer on one examination, and we think we're going to do that going forward, with the court's --
THE COURT: That's OK.
MR. AGNIFILO: OK. All right. Let me start with the David James issue for a second. I think your Honor touched on the important issue that what I hear the government saying is that there are really no bounds to the employment description of this person. And I think that sort of defeats with the whole purpose of this hearsay exception is. I mean, I think this hearsay exception is supposed to be, for instance, this is a company, you know, if it deals with fashion, that there is going to be statements that have to do with the mission of the company. And so those sorts of statements get to be an exception to the hearsay rule because there is some independent indicia of reliability. So that we're not as concerned about sworn statements and cross-examined statements. I think all of those underline, underlying rationales, disappear from what I see the government arguing here, which is that it's almost that any piece of hearsay would be admissible because the job description is so vague and so open. And that's not really what these things were about. There is nothing about the -- anyone's job description to deal with fights or to deal with, you know, arguments or to deal with things like that. I mean, it's our contention, these are all personal matters, and I think that by taking another side of that, I just don't believe that the government's view of the facts is justified on the record so far, so that anything would be a matter of hearsay if a personal assistant hears someone else say it. So I think that the government's position is inconsistent with the core of this particular exception. I think now, to be clear, obviously any witness can talk about anything that they see, anything that they hear, and anything that they do. What they can't do is they can't --
THE COURT: Not everything that they hear. That's what we're talking about.
MR. AGNIFILO: From a hearsay standpoint. I do think it's -- I think it is still hearsay, and I hear where your Honor is thinking, at least even if it could be within the exception, given the nature of the exception that the government is asking your Honor to sort of accept, that we run into 403 issues because it becomes a dwindling relevance. I think both exceptions very much apply. I do think it's hearsay without a valid exception, and I do think it is unduly prejudicial under 403. These are things, I mean, I think some of these witnesses are going to testify at the trial about things that they personally observed, things that personally happened to them, and we should be permitted to cross-examine those people.
THE COURT: Well, let me focus you in on the last thing that we addressed with Ms. Slavik, which is the assault on the chef. OK. So, in that context, there is an instruction from the defendant to Mr. James to file a police report. Mr. James learns from a security, a member of the security detail, that actually what happened is that the defendant assaulted the chef, right. That's the allegation. And wouldn't it be within the security officer's -- not officer -- but someone who is in security, who is running security 24/7 for the defendant, telling Mr. James, who's been asked to file a police report, that here is what actually happened, which is certainly within the purview of someone who is responsible for security, to be monitoring issues of violence or assaults or things of that nature that occur involving their protectee, the defendant. He says, Well, it wasn't a situation where he was attacked. Actually, he did the attacking. You show know that because you've been asked to file a police report which, by the way, is also within the security officer's purview. So why, given all that, wouldn't it overcome the hearsay objection, then we move to the relevance issue?
MR. AGNIFILO: So, if I could, if I could deal with the second issue first. There is a reason for me doing so. I cannot -- I do not know what relevance some interaction between Mr. Combs and the chef has to this racketeering conspiracy. I mean, I think we're just getting very far afield, and I think this is becoming sort of a bad act free-for-all. I don't know where this is in the indictment. I don't know where this is in the pattern of racketeering activity that's been alleged. I don't know where this is in terms of the enterprise that's been alleged. Now, I've done this long enough to know that almost any fact done in a racketeering conspiracy case can arguably be part of the enterprise. But that is where 403 comes in, because we have to put in some sort of limits to the actions that are not directly related to the pattern of racketeering activity. And there is no pattern of racketeering activity, there is no racketeering act that concerns the chef.
There is no racketeering activity that concerns any assault. We have to keep in mind, assault is just not one of the racketeering acts because RICO does not have assault as a racketeering act. Congress made that decision in 1970. So we're running the risk, I think, of creating a very prejudicial environment where the government is trying to get in all of this bad act evidence that has character components to it that, sort of, fits an assault. It's coming into evidence and that has never been a theory that I've understood is a valid theory that the government is trying to propound here. The assaults are relevant at this trial to the extent that they had some effect on a purported victim to this sex trafficking. That is it. The assaults are not relevant, the assaults aren't racketeering activity, and the assaults are unduly prejudicial. I think your Honor's questions, as I understood it when you asked my colleague, why is any of this evidence relevant? I think that's right. I think we're just getting too far afield. I see my colleague wants to say something.
THE COURT: Ms. Slavik, is it your submission that this would be relevant as relating to a tampering with a witness victim or an informant, or what is the other basis for --
MS. SLAVIK: Your Honor, this is relevant to the means and methods of the enterprise. I also want to note that the chef is identified as a victim of forced labor. That's in the government's enterprise letter dated March 10, 2025. And so these actions related to the chef are undoubtedly within the scope of the enterprise and the racketeering activity alleged.
THE COURT: Even though it's not perhaps directly relevant to one of the predicates, it is relevant to the means and methods of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment.
MS. SLAVIK: Your Honor, to put a finer point on that, I think the evidence is related to the racketeering activity, specifically to the forced labor.
THE COURT: Understood.
MS. SLAVIK: Excuse me. The forced labor predicate.
THE COURT: Related to the chef.
MS. SLAVIK: Correct.
THE COURT: Understood. Anything else, Mr. Agnifilo, relating to the myriad of issues that were raised?
MR. AGNIFILO: Yes. I'm trying to make sure I kept them all lined up. I think that's it for Mr. James. I'm going to defer to Ms. Westmoreland on the other witness.
MS. WESTMORELAND: Good morning.
THE COURT: Good morning.
MS. WESTMORELAND: In regards to Ms. Richard, I'm going to discuss the alleged threats by Mr. Combs that the government is asking you to admit. The alleged threat that the government wants admissible now is not similarly situated to the alleged threat that you've already allowed in evidence. The alleged threat that you allowed into evidence is an incident, the egg incident, where Ms. Richard claims Mr. Combs assaulted Ms. Ventura right in front of her. The very next day, close in time, she says Mr. Combs brings her into the room and threatens her about what she saw. So, Don't tell what you saw or this is going to happen. These other alleged threats are nowhere near close proximity to any assault. They are not similarly situated. As a matter of fact, the other alleged threats, you'll go missing, I'll make you go missing, people go dark. Those allegedly, in discovery, the only ones that I've seen was in reference to the Danity Kane era. And just to put this in a timeframe for your Honor, Ms. Richard has a relationship with Mr. Combs from 2004 to 2011. Danity Kane is from 2004 to 2009. Ms. Richard testified that she never saw violence until 2009, once she goes over to Diddy Dirty Money. These alleged threats, You'll go missing, I make people go dark, things of that nature, she expressly says that these comments were made, or these attempted threats were made to her, during the DK era, which would be pre seeing Ms. Ventura allegedly assaulted. They are not close to an assault period and they predate it. As a matter of fact, in the most recent interview with the government, the government asked Ms. Richard, Tell me about the other threats. They are in your civil complaint, paragraph 64, 65. And she said that was about the DK era.
THE COURT: Ms. Steiner, do you agree with that characterization?
MS. STEINER: I do not, your Honor. I'm trying to bring up the 3500 now.
THE COURT: You don't need to convince me now. I want to make sure you disagree with it.
MS. STEINER: I do disagree, your Honor.
THE COURT: I was advised they are similar to, I'll call it, the skillet incident.
MS. STEINER: That is correct, your Honor.
THE COURT: And in the recording studio. You have to lay the foundation that that is the case. And I understand from Ms. Westmoreland that if you fail to do that, she is going to stand up and object, and I'll address it at that time. If it's related to something totally separate, it would fall within the ruling and be excluded. I understand from you that it falls into the same exact category as to the recording studio incident. You'll have to make that case. Ms. Westmoreland, you're free to object when, if Ms. Steiner is not able to establish that foundation. And, in any event, you'll be able to cross-examine Ms. Richard based on the materials that you've identified.
MS. WESTMORELAND: Thank you, your Honor. If I can briefly address the alleged threats by Mr. Pierre. So, this is in regards to a meeting where Ms. Richard is asking to be relieved from her contract. And allegedly Mr. Pierre says, Where are you going to go? That, number one, I don't understand how that is even perceived as a threat. Number two, for Ms. Richard to say that she perceived that as some kind of threat is complete speculation.
THE COURT: Now, that was within the scope of my ruling. I understand that, from Ms. Steiner, there is separate statements that have been made by Mr. Pierre that she is going to elicit. She understands that the kind of statement you just referred to is within the scope of my ruling is out.
MS. WESTMORELAND: All right. Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: I'm seeing a nod from the front. I think we're on the same page.
MR. AGNIFILO: Your Honor, one last thing. I apologize. I believe that the situation between Mr. Combs and the chef was after the chef had terminated her employment, so I don't know what relevance it would have to the forced labor. That is my understanding of it factually. So I think that could be relevant.
MS. SLAVIK: Your Honor, the chef was literally cooking eggs for him. She was a chef. This is within the scope of her employment.
THE COURT: Understood. Let me think about the issue, Ms. Slavik, that you raised, and I'll let you know if I'm going to change my ruling on that particular incident before Mr. James testifies.
MS. SLAVIK: Thank you, your Honor.
MS. FOSTER: Your Honor, can I just flag two very quick things about Ms. Morgan's testimony?
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. FOSTER: The first is that, at one point, I conferred with defense counsel on this. She is going to be testifying about Mr. Combs' alleged assault of her or assault of her.
THE COURT: The "her" being Ms. Morgan?
MS. FOSTER: Yeah, Ms. Morgan. At that point, there is -- Mr. Combs makes a statement to her about Ms. Ventura that raises a 412 issue based on the specific words that were used. I flagged to defense counsel that, in that place, I'm going to just say, without going into the specific words, what did he express anger about. Just to flag that.
THE COURT: Understood.
MS. FOSTER: The second thing is that defense provided us a list of the exhibits they plan to admit for Ms. Morgan yesterday. We reviewed them and responded to defense counsel with, sort of, very specific objections, and then also noting how, what basis they are admissible as they appear to be hearsay. Based on our communications, my understanding had been that they were only going to admit them to refresh the witness's recollection or as potential impeachment material. I now understand that may not be true based on talking to defense counsel, that, actually, they may show Ms. Morgan certain of the exhibits. If she doesn't remember them, then they may seek to admit them. At that point, we would firmly take the position that that is hearsay.
THE COURT: Understood. Let's try to get these things aired in advance so that we can run through them before we have the jury in.
MS. FOSTER: Yes.
THE COURT: However, in this instance, I'll deal with the objections as they come up.
MS. FOSTER: OK. Thank you.
THE COURT: Understood. The only other housekeeping issue, I understand, Ms. Slavik, as to the Local Rule 23.1 issue, there is nothing needed from the court at this time, correct?
MS. SLAVIK: Not at this time, your Honor.
THE COURT: OK. And then the only other thing, general housekeeping, is that there is a lot of e-mail correspondence concerning applications that have been made via e-mail. We have an application from the press that that correspondence be posted to the docket. I think that is well taken. What I'll ask you to do is have your staff organize the correspondence and then file what exists to date by next Tuesday. So, not something you have to deal with urgently. Let's get it on the docket by next Tuesday, and try to handle that on a weekly basis. Just so people know who is supposed to do this. Let's say then, it's your application, you are responsible for getting the e-mail correspondence together. And you can just file a very short letter that says that this attached e-mail correspondence was submitted to the court, and then attach the correspondence, file it on the docket. The defense can do the same thing for any application that it was responsible for. With that, I take it, Mr. Courtroom deputy, that we have our jury.
COURT CLERK: Yes, I believe so, your Honor.
THE COURT: Let's have Ms. Richard back.
MS. GERAGOS: We are just going to bring up the binder, your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you. Binders. Great. Welcome back.
DAWN RICHARD: Thank you.
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(Jury present)
THE COURT: Please be seated. Welcome back, members of the jury. I hope you had a great weekend. Ms. Richard, you understand you're still under oath?
DAWN RICHARD: Yes, sir. DAWN RICHARD, resumed.
THE COURT: Ms. Steiner, you can proceed when ready.
MS. STEINER: Thank you, your Honor.