UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ------------------------------x UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. 24 Cr. 542 (AS) SEAN COMBS, a/k/a "Puff Daddy," a/k/a "P. Diddy," a/k/a "Diddy," a/k/a "PD," a/k/a "Love," Defendant. Trial
New York, N.Y. May 29, 2025 8:40 a.m. Before: HON. ARUN SUBRAMANIAN, District Judge -and a Jury- APPEARANCES JAY CLAYTON United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York BY: MADISON R. SMYSER EMILY A. JOHNSON MAURENE R. COMEY MEREDITH FOSTER MITZI STEINER MARY C. SLAVIK Assistant United States Attorneys APPEARANCES
(Continued)
AGNIFILO INTRATER LLP Attorneys for Defendant BY: MARC A. AGNIFILO TENY R. GERAGOS -and- SHER TREMONTE BY: ANNA M. ESTEVAO -and- SHAPIRO ARATO BACH LLP BY: ALEXANDRA A.E. SHAPIRO JASON A. DRISCOLL JONATHAN P. BACH -and- XAVIER R. DONALDSON BRIAN STEEL NICOLE WESTMORELAND ALSO PRESENT: LUCY GAVIN, AUSA Paralegal Specialist SHANNON BECKER, AUSA Paralegal Specialist RAYMOND MCLEOD, Defense Paralegal Specialist
(Trial resumed; jury not present)
THE COURT: First, any issues with the proposed instruction relating to Mia? Given that the parties had proposed that, I didn't think there would be. Any objection there?
MS. SMYSER: No, your Honor.
MS. SHAPIRO: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: And I understand the government has an application relating to the feed that goes into the overflow room; is that right?
MS. SMYSER: Yes, your Honor. We would ask that the feed that shows the witness box be cut during Mia's testimony. But they would still be able to hear the audio of what she is saying.
THE COURT: I am not going to do that, because my understanding of how this is working is that there is not enough space in this courtroom and it is the only reason why there are overflow courtrooms, and there are press and other people who would be in this courtroom but for the space that we have here. And that those other overflow rooms are extensions of this courtroom.
And for that reason, I think it would be improper to cut off that feed. Although we will make the appropriate arrangements that we've discussed. For instance, there should be no sketches of Mia when she's testifying and the Court security and the marshals have been informed and are going to remind everybody in the overflow rooms, just as they will hear that no cell phones or other devices can be used to document Mia and her appearance in any way. So we'll make those adjustments.
MS. SMYSER: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Let's go to the motion to strike on Dr. Hughes. For the reasons set forth in the government's May 28th letter, the motion to strike is denied.
As the government's letter and the defense's application observes, the Court sustained objections to numerous questions that the defense complains about and to numerous answers to the extent they began to veer off course. Because of this and the Court's pretrial rulings, which the examination stayed within, the witness's testimony stayed within the bounds of the Court's Daubert ruling.
The Court notes specifically that there were no objections lodged as to many questions, such as those regarding trauma bonds and love bombing, which were proper given the Court's pretrial ruling and limited in scope. There were also no objections to the discussion of formal and informal coping strategies, and this testimony was consistent with the Court's Daubert ruling.
To the extent that the defense argues that this testimony was not properly disclosed, the Court disagrees. It was fairly encompassed by the disclosure, which was extremely detailed, unlike the minimal disclosure, really a non-disclosure in the Mrabet case.
And the disclosure here candidly stated that: Dr. Hughes will speak about a broad range of defense mechanisms and coping strategies commonly used by victims in response to sexual abuse. As the advisory committee observed in connection with the 2022 amendments to Rule 16, the rule does not require a verbatim recitation of the testimony the expert will give at trial. And prior to trial, there was no objection on sufficiency grounds that that portion of the disclosure was insufficiently detailed. And of course, the defense was on notice given the language of the disclosure that there was a category of coping mechanisms that Dr. Hughes would testify about.
Precisely because of the Court's pretrial narrowing of Dr. Hughes' testimony and the sustaining of objections during her testimony, this case presents none of the issues raised in cases like United States v. Zhong, 26 F.4d 536 (2d Cir. 2022), where the government's expert not only opined upon the ultimate question of forced labor, but commented on the evidence in the case, which Dr. Hughes did not do, and the motivations of those who perpetrate forced labor, which Dr. Hughes did not do, employing prejudicial cultural stereotypes along the way. None of that happened here. And as the government observes in its letter, this testimony that is far broader than that permitted here has been allowed in numerous cases, such as Ray.
As for the defense's challenge to Dr. Hughes's testimony on memory as junk science, Dr. Hughes established both her academic qualifications, her 30 years of clinical experience, and her work with thousands of trauma victims. Her testimony about memory, that we can have a vivid, bright memory sort of burned into our brain, but at the same time have a lack of details and fragments for that same trauma, or that we know that trauma memories can be forgotten or not recalled and recalled at a later time, were reasonably based on her expertise, which the defense did not question, and are precisely the kind of specialized testimony that is outside of the ken of ordinary jurors.
The upshot of the defense's argument is that any testimony regarding the common behaviors of sexual abuse victims is pseudoscience, an indictment on the entire field of psychology that the Court rejects and the defense cites no case for this proposition.
Finally, the Court rejects the defense's rule 403 objection for the reasons stated above and in the government's letter, and especially given the combination of the Court's pretrial narrowing of the Dr. Hughes' opinions, the close control of Dr. Hughes' testimony during her examination, the defense's full throated cross-examination of Dr. Hughes, and the limitations on the government's use of Dr. Hughes's testimony the risk of unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh the probative value of her testimony.
The only thing that I'll note for the government is that in the defense's submission, there's Dr. Hughes's testimony as it was offered, but one of their principal concerns is how that testimony is going to be utilized in the context of summations. So the only thing I will flag for the government is that there are a number of representations that have been made about the limited scope of Dr. Hughes's testimony, and the government should just keep that in mind as they're doing their summations, that they don't at that point in time try to go through the back door, that the defense suggests the government really wants to go through, and instead make sure they are being true to the rulings that the Court made and which the government complied with in terms of the examination, and not try to exceed that which is going to draw a vigorous objection, I am sure, during closings if there is any violation along those lines.
So with that, the motion to strike is denied.
Let's go to the exhibits concerning Mia. Now, the defense responded with what had previously been missing, which is a response on the hearsay and relevance objections. So my question for the government is what objections remain for adjudication?
MS. SMYSER: Your Honor, I think our objections remain across the board here. I think every -- the relevance proffers are helpful, but I think we still maintain 403 objections.
THE COURT: Let's break it down then. As to the cover letter on the scrapbook, the defense explains why that would be highly relevant given the context of that letter. So just put the scrapbook to the side. What about the cover letter?
MS. SMYSER: So, your Honor, I think the cover letter is being offered by the defense to prove Mia's state of mind. But as we discussed yesterday related to Ms. Ventura, I think that state of mind needs to be tied to a particular moment in time that is relevant to the case. What has not been proffered is how Mr. Combs' 45th birthday provides like that kind of relevant event.
THE COURT: And I take it, whoever is going to address this from the defense's side, that it will be established what time period the letter was sent. And so to the extent that it is coming in as state of mind evidence, then it will be that state of mind at that time. Correct?
MS. SHAPIRO: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. So I'm going to overrule the objection to the cover letter.
Now, as to the scrapbook, why is that coming into evidence? Meaning, the scrapbook can be referenced and the government doesn't have any objection to that being used, even I take it as a demonstrative to explain and show the jury these are the kind of things that Mia was sending at the time. So why does this have to be something that goes back into the jury room? Which is really the only distinction that we're talking about here.
MS. SHAPIRO: Well, your Honor, this is substantive evidence and I think, you know, it's important to note not only the incredible detail and care and extensive nature of the scrapbook and the highlighting, but -- and I don't think we put this in our letter, but Mia created three original versions of this for Mr. Combs. And I think it's important for the jury to see the entire book, to understand exactly how much care and attention and work she put into this. Because it really is going to undermine her testimony and demonstrate, you know, the defense's perspective on her credibility, the veracity of her tale of terror perpetrated by Mr. Combs. And, you know, it's substantive evidence.
And, clearly, we're not putting in -- we're not asking the jury to consider the truth of these articles. That's not the issue. And as we indicated in the letter, it's perfectly appropriate for the Court to instruct the jury to that effect. But that's not what this is.
And it's no different from, you know, the government puts in all kinds of evidence that one could say should be a demonstrative. Like they were able to put in photos of guns and then parade the guns themselves before the jury. This is no different than that. This is substantive defense evidence which undermines the government's arguments as to Mia and her allegations against Mr. Combs.
THE COURT: Do you have those scrapbooks?
MS. SHAPIRO: Yes, your Honor. Would be happy to hand up.
THE COURT: Ms. Smyser, what's the prejudice of this? I mean, I hear you that there's not much -- I don't know whether there's a high probative value to this evidence. I don't think it's being put in for the truth of the matter asserted. So there's not some other objection. It's just the probative value is pretty low, but also the prejudicial value would seem to be pretty low from the government's perspective too, so, given that questions can be asked and everything else.
So maybe you can help me understand why you think this is a big problem in terms of going back to the jury room, which is really all we're talking about.
MS. SMYSER: Your Honor, a few points there. I understand the defense says they're not offering these articles for the truth of the matter, but this is the kind of thing that they have been trying to get in the entire trial about Mr. Combs' life and legacy. And they have heard -- the jurors have heard testimony about that. And these articles catalog his life from 1991 through 1999, and I think it would be very -- it would be difficult for the jury to ignore that. And I think the defense is trying to get it in for the truth of the matter.
But, the probative value, as your Honor said, is very low given that they can question Mia about it. We have no objection to it being a demonstrative in this case, but there is prejudicial -- this is prejudicial if it goes back to the jury room.
So I just, you know, flipping through the articles last night, for example, there are discussions of Biggie's murder, which I think don't play a role here. And there's, for example, a passage where Mr. Combs is saying in regard to Biggie's murder: I'm always spending time with my people wondering who killed my man, but the Feds are spending their time investigating us for criminal activity. And this is the kind of things that in these articles that would be going back to the jury, which is on its face prejudicial to the government.
And so I think there's -- with the probative value being so low given all the defense could do without these articles going back to the jury, given that they can question Mia on them, I don't think there's any reason to send this back with them.
MS. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, may I respond?
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. SHAPIRO: I think it's not fair to say that this has low probative -- well, first of all, let me just say that we, in no way, intend to argue anything for the truth of any of these articles. That is not at all the point. And the point here is as to Mia's state of mind and her -- and I'm still speaking, counsel --
THE COURT: Hold on. Hold on. Directed up here.
MS. SHAPIRO: If you can let me finish before you respond.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. SHAPIRO: So that's not at all what's going on here, so that's why we offer and agree that there should be a clear limiting instruction. But we think it's particularly important that the jury see the scrapbook, not to read the articles, but to see the care with which Mia put it together. And because part of the point here is that, as to Mia's state of mind, is that she loved Mr. Combs and wanted to promote his legacy. And it's really important. There's a big difference between eliciting oral testimony about this and showing the jury the binder with all the highlighting, etc. So, your Honor, I respect --
THE COURT: I take it -- well, I think, look, the objection to this, the scrapbook being put in as substantive evidence is sustained. Because this doesn't come close to meeting the 403 bar in terms of substantive evidence that the jury could get in the jury room. Because in the jury room, if they were doing that and looking at the articles, then I agree with the government that there is the potential for prejudice and the probative value in that context is low.
The concern that you've now raised, which is that we want to do more than just give testimony, we want to be able to show the jury the scrapbook, is a fair concern, and the government does not object to you actually showing the jury. And I take it, as a demonstrative, Ms. Smyser, even if the defense just wanted to the hand the binder around for the jury to just kind of flip through quickly, you know, at some point, there would be no objection to that because that's something that they could do with a demonstrative. If you had a case involving an accident and there was a ladder, the jury could, like, look at the ladder, right, in the courtroom. It wouldn't go back as evidence, but it would be usable in that kind of quick way.
MS. SMYSER: I think in a quick way, your Honor, I don't know that we would have an objection to that.
THE COURT: Or counsel could simply go in front of the jury and just show them like how many articles there were and, you know, you could even -- as I am looking through this, I get the defense's point they want to show that a lot of care went into this. And so if they just flip through it for the jury so they can see how many articles and they're nicely put in here and everything like that, then there would be no objection to that. Right?
MS. SMYSER: I think it's especially no objection to counsel flipping through the binder in front of the jury. If it is passed around, I would ask for a limiting instruction that it not -- the articles here not be considered for the truth of the matter.
THE COURT: And who's doing the cross-examination?
MS. SHAPIRO: That's Mr. Steel, but I think we would prefer to pass -- have it passed around with a limiting instruction if the Court would do that as a demonstrative.
THE COURT: There's a feasible way. We're going to have a break at some point where we can figure out the mechanics of this.
So, Mr. Steel, it's your show. You're in charge of the cross-examination, so whatever way you think is more conducive to how you want to conduct your cross, we will either do it with some limiting instruction and hand it around, but it's got to be brief, or if you want to show the jury, thumb through it, that's another way to do it.
MR. STEEL: Thank you, your Honor. I understand.
THE COURT: Ms. Smyser.
MS. SMYSER: I think, your Honor, we would ask he be allowed to thumb through it given the nature of the articles that I highlighted here that are prejudicial on their face.
If your Honor is considering two options, I think the point comes across if Mr. Steel flips through it in front of the jury.
THE COURT: I think so too. Look, just from a tactical perspective on cross-examination, if you give the jury something, then they're going to be focusing on that and not focusing on the cross-examination. So think about it. We will address it on the break.
MR. STEEL: Can I ask a question, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. STEEL: Thank you. And good morning to your Honor good morning to everyone.
THE COURT: Good morning.
MR. STEEL: Your Honor, and I understand the ruling. I will obviously follow -- I will follow the Court's ruling. But my question is this, would you consider if that's what the government, what they just highlighted about the federal authorities not looking at a murder but they're looking at us, if that could be redacted if that's all the government says, would you then reconsider?
THE COURT: That's an example. That's not all they're complaining about. And the issue is this binder, the substance of what's in these articles, the defense concedes has no relevance to this case. It is the fact that this was put together.
To that extent, there is no value at all in this going back to the jury room during deliberations. The value is met by the jury being shown the scrapbook so that they can understand the care and attention that went into this given how many articles are here. Which is something that can be done in the courtroom. And given that the actual scrapbook does not go to the substance of this case, that's the, you know, the gravamen of the government's objection.
But I will leave the mechanics of how to handle it, you have been given some leeway by the government. They're not objecting to its use in the courtroom. So I'll leave it to you to make an election how you would like to do that consistent with your cross-examination.
MR. STEEL: I understand. I don't want to waive the issue. I do want to go back, but I understand what the Court said. We will follow the Court's order. Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Next, the social media post, I understand there's an objection to not the pictures but certain of the statements. I'm going to overrule the objection to the social media posts for the reasons stated in the defense's letter.
That leaves these text messages. So here is the question on the text messages. Based on what the defense says, my sense is that there may be, in fact, certain parts of these messages or certain messages in the threads that are improper hearsay to the extent that they relate to historical events and they're not properly admissible, there isn't a way to get them in.
Have the parties discussed how to get in the non-hearsay portions of those text messages or how do we want to resolve those? What's the easiest way to do this?
MS. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, we would be happy to confer with the government again during the break about that issue.
THE COURT: Does that make sense, Ms. Smyser?
MS. SMYSER: That's fine, your Honor.
THE COURT: Help me out here. There are two, I think there are two basic exhibits. One is just one message and then one is a two-year string of messages; is that correct?
MS. SMYSER: Your Honor, I think there are -- those two are two of the text messages that we have objected to, yes. And I think there are some redactions could be done to address the hearsay issues in those exhibits, yes.
THE COURT: Okay. And then that should resolve, that would resolve the government's objections, or am I missing anything?
MS. SMYSER: No. To those two, I think that is correct, your Honor. There are in addition a few other -- or at least one other text message thread, which is Defense Exhibit 1735, which I am not sure if you are addressing now.
THE COURT: I will address it now if you don't think it's likely that you'll be able to work out the objection.
MS. SMYSER: Yeah. So I don't think it's likely for that exhibit.
THE COURT: Just give me one second and I'll pull it up.
All right. I'm there.
MS. SMYSER: So, your Honor, there is potential hearsay throughout this thread. But I want to focus the Court on the final text message in this thread, which is what the defense appears to be focused on. And it seems that they are putting in this text message for its truth to show that the defendant was going through some "heavy shit" and that's why he was acting the way he was.
So we have a hearsay objection to that. But in addition here, I think Mia is speculating about what is in the defendant's mind. And so there is an additional objection to that for this text message.
THE COURT: You don't have an objection to the text message where Mia is indicating that she smelled her own armpit?
MS. SMYSER: I mean, I don't think that's relevant, your Honor.
THE COURT: Fair. 401.
So this is really focused on the last two messages; is that right?
MS. SMYSER: Well, I think there is hearsay throughout, but from my understanding from the defense, these are the messages that they intend to focus on in the cross-examination and they're the messages highlighted in their letter.
THE COURT: All right. So just to try to simplify things, prior to these last messages, just so I understand the objection, you might have an objection, but is it one that you care to assert? Meaning that I'm looking at the back and forth communications. It's a lot of just small talk, for a lack of a better term. The real objection that you're raising is to the last messages? I mean, you're not waiving anything. I'm going to consider --
MS. SMYSER: Yes, I think you should focus on the end of this text chain, your Honor.
THE COURT: Let me hear from the defense. Why is this not inadmissible hearsay?
MR. STEEL: Your Honor, this is a date, if you notice, of March 16th, 2016. I believe you will learn that Mia is still employed with Combs Enterprises at that time.
I believe that she will testify -- I don't know obviously -- but I believe she will testify that it was a crushing time working the eight years that she did at Combs Enterprises. That she was in constant fear of Mr. Combs.
This is a conversation between her, and I believe you will find out, her best friend, Ms. Ventura. And Ms. Ventura is saying how she is going to not do an event because she's had it basically with Mr. Combs and his conduct.
And what Mia is saying at this time is her state of mind, this is not hearsay, I'm not asking for a diagnosis or anything, but she's protecting Mr. Combs.
The testimony may come out, we will see it, that she is so afraid of Mr. Combs, yet now she is minimizing, protecting, somehow taking up for Mr. Combs.
I believe this is highly relevant to her state of mind at that time. This is a critical point for us as well. If you notice the date, it is approximately 10 days after, 11 days after the InterContinental event that started the case. And the Court may remember there was several witnesses and videos of that event.
So what I'm arguing, respectfully, to this honorable court, is I believe the jurors are entitled to see that a woman who is coming to this courtroom to announce how violent and dark Mr. Combs is, actually protects him to her best friend. That is why I believe it is non-hearsay and it goes to her state of mind at that exact time, 10 days after the video beating at the InterContinental.
THE COURT: All right. Ms. Smyser.
MR. STEEL: I hope I answered your question, but that's why it's non-hearsay to me.
THE COURT: Well, it partially answers it. I understand why it would go to her state of mind at the time. But it is not, in fact, a statement of her state of mind. Right?
MR. STEEL: I don't -- I think it is. I think she's protecting Mr. Combs. And it also goes to the relationship of the parties. I believe -- and, you know, your Honor, I gave over -- the defense, not just me -- gave overall of our exhibits in an effort of good will and, you know, to try to be transparent and professional. So a lot of these exhibits are truly for impeachment. And I believe that she will testify that she was in fear of Mr. Combs, yet she is protecting him here. I think that this is highly probative. I would really like the Court to consider admitting it. And --
THE COURT: Well, why don't you get it in -- I mean, can you go through the steps and try to get it in as a prior inconsistent statement?
MR. STEEL: Sure. But I raised it now and I told the government this and I thought told the Court this, a lot of this impeachment, prior inconsistent statements to try to impeach her testimony. But I gave it early and gave it to the government --
THE COURT: Fair enough. Ms. Smyser, if can you try to address, so Mr. Steel says putting impeachment aside, it's not being put in for the truth of the diagnosis that she makes as to Mr. Combs. It's showing the fact that she's making -- she's saying that would be potentially highly relevant to show that her state of mind at that time was positive, upbeat, and not crushed and kind of negative.
MS. SMYSER: I understand the argument for potential relevance. But it is still inadmissible hearsay. It doesn't fall within the scope of 803(3). I think as your Honor pointed out, it is not a statement of her then existing state of mind such as motive, intent, plan or any emotional sensory or physical condition.
She is speculating as to Mr. Combs' state of mind. And if I asked her on the stand why was Mr. Combs upset with Cassie, I would expect an objection that would be sustained. He can't smuggle that in with this text message, your Honor. If it's for impeachment, that's a different thing and we can assess that as it comes up. But for it to be admitted in the first instance, under 803(3), I think that's entirely inappropriate here.
THE COURT: All right. I agree with the government. Here, I think for purposes other than impeachment, I don't see grounds to admit this message at least. And I don't think any other part of the message is relevant. So 1735 is excluded.
However, Mr. Steel, we're going to see how the examination goes. So either you'll try to introduce it and, you know, based on impeachment. But based on the nature of the testimony, if for whatever reason you believe the government has opened the door or you want to reurge your objection, all you need to do is ask for a sidebar and we'll do that.
MR. STEEL: And, your Honor, to note, I gave all of these over, and the government has been nothing but professional. They will not share this in any way in any form with the lawyer or Mia herself, because I did give over the impeachment evidence, as you told us to.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. STEEL: And I appreciate the government giving us that validation.
THE COURT: Ms. Smyser, anything else you see on the horizon given the disclosures you received that we should deal with now as opposed to allowing the parties a little time to meet and confer?
MS. SMYSER: No. I want to put on the record, your Honor, that we are in discussions with Mr. Steel about potential 412 issues that could arise on three topics during Mia's testimony. I understand that the defense doesn't intend to come anywhere close to the 412 line, but if they do, we would strenuously object and ask that they take a sidebar before introducing any of that.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Steel, I think that was really directed at you. So I think you were listening and I take it that you will adhere to those lines that have been drawn.
MR. STEEL: So the line that I understand, and I thought last time I was within the line, but I heard the Court. I thought it was opened, the door was opened. But Mia had a relationship about four years with someone at the company during this time that she alleges this abuse. And I understand that that's okay to talk about it in that context. So that's from the government. And if I said that wrong, I would like them to tell me now so I don't have to ask for a sidebar, but if I do, then I will do that.
MS. SMYSER: I think, as we have discussed several times, crossing on the fact of the relationship is completely fine from the government's perspective. It is when you get into sexual acts or anything of sexual nature that that --
THE COURT: You don't have an objection to -- I mean, we have to explain what relationship means. So if Mr. Steel were to say did you have a romantic relationship with this person, that wouldn't run into any 412 issues. Right?
MS. SMYSER: I think romantic is fine, your Honor.
THE COURT: So I think that's a way to convey what you likely want to convey without running into a potential 412 issue.
MR. STEEL: That's what I was trying to do last time, but I'm glad -- I will use the word romantic relationship. Thank you.
THE COURT: All right. Very good.
Great. Anything else from the government?
MS. COMEY: Yes, your Honor. With respect to Mr. Nash, at 8:55 a.m. the defense sent me about ten new exhibits, some of which are multiple pages. I've taken a look at some of them. Some I won't object to, but some I would have objections to as improper impeachment, totally irrelevant, or hearsay.
So I don't know what the defense is planning to do with these messages that they've just sent to me, but I wanted to flag for your Honor that given all of those issues and given your Court's admonition that the Court needs to be sending us exhibits that they intend to offer substantively in advance, I would ask your Honor to preclude them from introducing any of these messages that they just sent me ten minutes ago.
THE COURT: Mr. Donaldson, are these going to impeachment or what are these exhibits?
MR. DONALDSON: Your Honor, excuse me. I'm sorry. Good morning, Judge.
THE COURT: Good morning.
MR. DONALDSON: Good morning everyone else.
I believe these -- we don't have a direct intention of admitting them I don't believe. So the ones that I think we're talking about that might be definitely admitted are two pictures that I think that -- those are simple. I told Ms. Comey, I think I sent an e-mail about that last night.
The other three or four I think may just be used for impeachment. And depending on how it turns out, it may come in, but I doubt it but the ones I'm definitely talking about I sent pictures to Ms. Comey last night.
MS. COMEY: That's correct, your Honor. Mr. Donaldson did tell me he wanted to introduce two pictures last night and I have no objection to that. I imagine the witness will be able to authenticate them, so that's fine.
But with respect to all of the other communications, hopefully they're only used for impeachment. If they're not I'll renew the objection.
THE COURT: You can renew the objection and if you reference, this is what we discussed this morning, I'll know what you're talking about.
MS. COMEY: Yes. Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Let's have Mr. Nash back and we'll bring our jury out.
Mr. Driscoll, if you want to grab...
MS. GERAGOS: Your Honor, may I put this on the...
THE COURT: You may.
MS. COMEY: I'll note for the record, your Honor, that we rebooked this witness's flight for 2:00 p.m. today. So we are hoping that he'll be off the stand in time to make that flight.
THE COURT: All right. Good morning. How are you doing.
DEONTE NASH: Blessed. And yourself?
THE COURT: Thank you.
DEONTE NASH: Can I take a seat?
THE COURT: You may.
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(In open court; jury present).
THE COURT: Welcome back, members of the jury.
Mr. Nash, you understand you are still under oath?
DEONTE NASH: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Mr. Donaldson, you may proceed when ready.