UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ------------------------------x UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. 24 Cr. 542 (AS) SEAN COMBS, a/k/a "Puff Daddy," a/k/a "P. Diddy," a/k/a "Diddy," a/k/a "PD," a/k/a "Love," Defendant. Trial
New York, N.Y. May 22, 2025 8:45 a.m. Before: HON. ARUN SUBRAMANIAN, District Judge -and a Jury- APPEARANCES JAY CLAYTON United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York BY: MADISON R. SMYSER EMILY A. JOHNSON MAURENE R. COMEY MEREDITH FOSTER MITZI STEINER MARY C. SLAVIK Assistant United States Attorneys APPEARANCES
(Continued)
AGNIFILO INTRATER LLP Attorneys for Defendant BY: MARC A. AGNIFILO TENY R. GERAGOS -and- SHER TREMONTE BY: ANNA M. ESTEVAO -and- SHAPIRO ARATO BACH LLP BY: ALEXANDRA A.E. SHAPIRO JASON A. DRISCOLL -and- XAVIER R. DONALDSON BRIAN STEEL NICOLE WESTMORELAND ALSO PRESENT: LUCY GAVIN, AUSA Paralegal Specialist SHANNON BECKER, AUSA Paralegal Specialist RAYMOND MCLEOD, Defense Paralegal Specialist
(Jury not present)
THE COURT: Mr. Driscoll, hopefully you got the Court's email about the summary charts.
MR. DRISCOLL: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: I may have missed the email. I don't think I have them.
MR. DRISCOLL: Right. I thought the government had provided them when they provided all exhibits. I will work to get them to you this morning.
THE COURT: That's not a problem. Is that an issue for today?
MS. COMEY: It is not an issue for today. If it is all right with your Honor, we would like to put in a response over the long weekend. We do not expect to offer any of these summary charts for at least a week, so I think we have time.
THE COURT: Perfect. Resolved. We are making progress.
On 629(a), is there going to be some foundation laid for what occurred on October 9, 2015? Because I agree with the government that the defendant's argument as to the hearsay nature of the statements is weak. However, there is a basic 401, 402, 403 issue, given that if you just read the text exchange, it is hard to understand what these two individuals are talking about, and neither Uncle Paulie nor Mr. Combs, unless he elects to do so, is going to be testifying to explain what is occurring in this text message.
So unless there is some other witness or some other evidence that is going to provide context for what occurred and what these two individuals are talking about, then the defense would seem to have a viable argument that there is just a failure to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the relevance and probative nature of the discussion. And, given that, their point is that given the context of the discussion and the language used, there is a serious risk of unfair prejudice.
I guess it's a long-winded way of saying, what's the evidence going to show leading up to the offer of this into evidence?
MS. SLAVIK: Yes, your Honor.
First of all, Gina, the subject of the discussion between Uncle Paulie and the defendant, has been brought up numerous times, as your Honor is well aware.
THE COURT: That's true, but not exactly in this way.
MS. SLAVIK: What I'd like to point out for your Honor is that the witness will testify first today. That's George Kaplan. He will testify that he witnessed an incident of violence between the defendant and Gina in 2015. And for that reason, your Honor, I think the government can establish by a preponderance the relevance --
THE COURT: Is it going to be in the fall of 2015 or something that would match up with the text exchange that we are talking about?
MS. COMEY: I'm happy to proffer, your Honor.
He doesn't remember exactly when. But what he will say is it was the final straw for him and the reason he put in his notice to leave, and then he left a couple months later. So he doesn't remember the exact time when it happened, but I think the inference is that it happened around the time of these messages.
MR. AGNIFILO: Can I add to that.
Unless his testimony is different than what was in his 3500 material, what he is going to say is that he saw Mr. Combs throwing apples at Gina, and he wasn't sure that any of the apples struck her. That's going to be his testimony. I don't know that that is -- that without a date is a far cry from this text exchange.
THE COURT: Let's see what happens because all I will say is, it is helpful to understand that Mr. Kaplan's testimony is going to lay some of the foundation for the introduction of this text exchange.
My understanding, Ms. Slavik, you are not going to offer this exhibit through a witness. You are going to do it after Mr. Kaplan's testimony.
MS. SLAVIK: That's right, your Honor.
THE COURT: Then we would be able to take a beat, and we can have a discussion as to whether it would be admissible or not. In fact, it doesn't need to come in immediately after Mr. Kaplan's testimony, is that right?
MS. SLAVIK: Not necessarily, your Honor, but the government would prefer to present it after Mr. Kaplan's testimony.
THE COURT: All I'll say is, whatever you are going to do to try to get this exhibit in, you should do it through Mr. Kaplan, and we will see where we are.
Mr. Agnifilo, I understand you will be cross-examining the witness and making some of the points that you're talking about.
MR. AGNIFILO: Correct.
My worry is that the government associating this text exchange, which has nothing to do with Mr. Kaplan, with the apple-throwing event without a date is an artificial suggestion. The fact that they want to put it in in connection with Kaplan's testimony, even if only soon thereafter, is itself just an artificial construct because Mr. Kaplan knows nothing about this telling Uncle Paulie or this event here.
But I agree with your Honor. Let's see how the evidence comes out, and at the end of that we can revisit it.
THE COURT: That takes care of that for the moment.
Now, as to Mr. Mescudi.
Mr. Steel, with the exception of Mr. Mescudi's speculation as to the reason for the 2015 apology, which I think the explanation of why Mr. Combs was apologizing would be out and would call for speculation, as to the other testimony, the government has responded and indicates, first, as to the conversation between Ms. Ventura and Mr. Mescudi that that would be admissible under the exception for state of mind and effect on the listener, and they say that, given the context of the discussion and the other evidence in the case, the probative value would outweigh the unfair prejudice.
As to Mr. Mescudi's discussion with Ms. Clark, it would seem to plainly fall within 803(1) through (3).
And as to the understanding from Mr. Mescudi that the defendant was involved in the arson, if he is testifying as to his reason for attending the meeting at the Soho House and he is just explaining why he did that, and that is his understanding, and not speculating as to anyone else's understanding, then it would seem to be admissible and not run afoul of Rule 403. I'll lay that out for you, and then I'll hear your response.
MR. STEEL: Good morning, your Honor. Good morning, everyone.
THE COURT: Good morning. Sorry.
MR. STEEL: Your Honor, I was listening intently, and it sounds like you said that the witness cannot speculate and say that Mr. Combs committed either the burglary or the arson. That's what I heard the Court say.
THE COURT: If I'm understanding right, he is going to say that the reason why he initiated the meeting at the Soho House was because he believed that Mr. Combs was responsible for the events that took place, the arson. So that's why he wanted to attend the meeting, because he wanted to squash it. If he's explaining why he did the meeting, then he is just giving -- that's why I did it. But he is not saying he did it or he told me that he did it or I thought he said that he did, something of that nature.
Ms. Johnson, am I correct about that? It's like, why did you go to this meeting? Here is why I went.
MS. JOHNSON: Right. I expect Mr. Mescudi will testify that he, after the arson, felt compelled to set up the meeting to have a discussion about this, and that's -- that is the reason he reached out to Mr. Combs and set up this meeting.
THE COURT: Because he was scared.
MS. JOHNSON: Yes.
THE COURT: Wanted to end it.
MS. JOHNSON: Exactly. Because there was a Molotov cocktail in his car. I don't think we will belabor the point.
THE COURT: That's not speculation. That's like what he thought.
MS. JOHNSON: That's what he thought when he set up the meeting.
THE COURT: That would be in, but only to that extent. As to the 2015 apology, to the extent that Mr. Mescudi was going to testify that, well, I thought the reason he was apologizing to me is because he knew he did that thing back in 2012, that's out. He can just say that there was an apology, and the jury can draw whatever inference it wants from that apology.
MR. STEEL: Understood. Thank you. I'm sticking with my objection, but I heard the honorable Court's ruling.
Can I go on to another topic?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. STEEL: I think that if the government is going to do this -- they say that the witness' dog was put behind a closed door on or around December 22 of 2011 -- I just want to make sure that they are not going to elicit testimony from him that the dog acted differently thereafter, somehow traumatized. I don't know if they are objecting to it. I thought they weren't, but it's in their notes from yesterday I just got.
MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, Mr. Mescudi will certainly testify about the location of the dog when he came home because that's relevant to his understanding of whether someone had been in his home or not because his dog had not been locked up when he left his home. I do think his observations about his dog after are relevant to the effects of this break-in on him. That is the primary thing.
THE COURT: He is not going to testify about what the dog thought.
MS. JOHNSON: He is not going to testify what the dog thought, certainly not. He is not a dog psychic.
THE COURT: He is going to say that the visible demeanor of the dog was different than it was usually and, given that it's his dog, he would know what the dog usually acts like.
MS. JOHNSON: Correct. He will say after the break-in the dog was jumpier and scared, more scared.
MR. STEEL: I will object. I don't see why we are getting into what a dog --
THE COURT: Let the record reflect the smirk on Mr. Steel's face.
MR. STEEL: I can't imagine that this is something that should come into this trial.
THE COURT: It's a 403 objection?
MR. STEEL: Yes.
THE COURT: You understand why the event in general is relevant, right, just the general event that we are talking about.
MR. STEEL: Unfortunately. I got that.
THE COURT: Why wouldn't it be part and parcel to that? When he comes in and he sees that the dog is behind the door, and he has let the dog out, and then the dog is jumpy and acting strange, why wouldn't that just be part of the event?
MR. STEEL: I don't think I would have a problem with that. That's not my understanding. It's afterwards, day two after the event. The next year the dog was never the same. The dog urinated on the floor. Why do we need that? Now we traumatized the dog. That's really what the government is doing. There are some dog lovers, potentially, on the jury.
THE COURT: I agree. It's a serious issue.
Ms. Johnson, I think there is a fair point. What are we talking about here? Is he going to say that when he got home and he opened the door, he noticed that the dog was acting differently, or is it going to like, now, even now, my dog acts like differently? At a certain point it becomes kind of far afield.
MS. JOHNSON: I agree, your Honor. Unfortunately, the dog is no longer with us.
THE COURT: Sorry to hear that.
MS. JOHNSON: He will testify that I'm happy to cabinet it to the immediate aftermath. I think he will say: When I came home, the dog was behind this locked door. I had not put the dog there. The dog has free rein of my home and the dog acted differently thereafter.
THE COURT: In the immediate aftermath.
MS. JOHNSON: Um-hum.
THE COURT: In the immediate aftermath I think is part of the event and that would be fair game.
But, Mr. Steel, I hear you. There should be no questioning, and I'll stop any answers that are about the long-term consequences to the dog. I hear your point on that.
MR. STEEL: Thank you.
I believe, your Honor, with regards to after the Porsche, it's a vehicle that has the fire device in it, I believe that it's out. But please make sure that I'm tracking this honorable Court that the witness, you're allowing to say after that, I wanted to meet with Mr. Combs. But you are not -- you are including that but you are not including that Mr. Combs must have hired someone to commit that. I understand that's out. That's in the note from yesterday as well, but I think you made it clear. Nobody should speculate that Mr. Combs was behind this.
THE COURT: I think the questioning needs to be precise. What was in your head when you made that meeting? If he is saying the reason why I made the meeting was X, Y, or Z, then that's fair game.
I think that Ms. Johnson is going to frame the questions and make sure that there isn't speculation about things like, well, he must have hired some squad to go do this, etc. Right?
MS. JOHNSON: Correct. I only intend to ask the witness why he set up the meeting.
THE COURT: This is one of those situations where, depending on the framing of the question and your control of the witness, it should be fine. But if the questions are too open-ended and the witness starts engaging in speculation, then I'll have to step in and stop it.
And, Mr. Steel, I'll understand you to object at that time.
MR. STEEL: I'm objecting now. I know I preserved it. But I don't think that his state of mind -- I understand this happened, and therefore I was moved to meet with Mr. Combs. I think it should be ended there. The addition -- and the reason I was moved to meet with Mr. Combs is because I speculate that he was behind this attack on my car.
THE COURT: How would you explain why he was doing the meeting in the first place? How do you connect the dots without explaining what the reason was to have a meeting?
MR. STEEL: I think that it's self-explanatory. This event happened at my house with the car, and I thought it would be prudent to meet with Mr. Combs.
THE COURT: Even though he had nothing to do with it.
MR. STEEL: Just leave it like that.
THE COURT: Is he just like a person who could figure it out, like sleuth it out?
MR. STEEL: Because introducing it is so prejudicial. It's his state of mind on total speculation. It's character evidence and it's 403. I don't see --
THE COURT: The question is whether it's unfairly prejudicial.
Ms. Johnson, what is the probative value of the meeting and the reasons why Mr. Mescudi arranged the meeting?
MS. JOHNSON: The meeting is probative because in the aftermath of the meeting the targeting of Mr. Mescudi stops. He meets with Mr. Combs. They talk it out. There is no more break-ins, there is no more Molotov cocktails in his driveway, and he sets up that meeting because of these things that have happened over the last few weeks.
THE COURT: Meaning there is an act of intimidation by the defendant, this is the government's narrative, and then there is this meeting and so it's a submissive act. Mr. Mescudi goes and has this meeting, and we will hear what happened at the meeting, and the reason he did that was to squash this because he could not have that continue in the future.
MS. JOHNSON: Exactly.
THE COURT: So the question is unfair prejudice.
Ms. Johnson has explained why this is probative. It may be prejudicial in the sense that all probative evidence is prejudicial if it goes to the government's theory of the case, but I don't see the unfair prejudice if we keep the limitations if the way that we have discussed here.
I'll certainly police those lines, and, Mr. Steel I'll hear you to object at the appropriate juncture.
But you have made the objection, so I have overruled it in the way that we have discussed here, so we will see how it comes in.
MR. STEEL: I understand the rules, and I respect what the Court said. If you can just ponder this, I don't mean to belabor it. If I could just have one moment.
THE COURT: Sure. Give me something to think on.
MR. STEEL: To say, oh, and then everything stopped thereafter, I didn't get any more harassment or vandalism to my home or my property, he can say that. I don't have a problem.
My problem is him saying, and my strong belief, my belief is that Mr. Combs was behind this.
That is a problem. The government can absolutely close on that and draw inferences. The jurors may do that themselves. But to have a witness without any type of foundation to say that Mr. Combs in his mind definitively did this, I don't see the prejudice -- I do see the prejudice as being highly, highly prejudicial to my client and that's my basis.
I'm not trying to belabor the point. I heard what the honorable Court said. But, your Honor, having a witness say, I'm a victim, my dog is a victim, this has disrupted my life and Mr. Combs had to be behind it, without any evidence, I don't think is proper.
THE COURT: I thought one of the things that was raised by the government was the discussion with Ms. Clark.
What are we talking about here, Ms. Johnson? Mr. Steel says there is no basis for Mr. Mescudi to speculate that the defendant was involved in any of this, so he shouldn't be able to speculate on that with reference to the Soho House meeting.
MS. JOHNSON: With respect to the break-in I, think there is absolutely no speculation involved. Mr. Mescudi has a phone call with Ms. Clark who says, I'm in the defendant's car in front of the house and he is in your home. He then has a call two times in the immediate aftermath with Mr. Combs, one of which where Mr. Combs says he is in his home. So I don't think there is any speculation with respect to the break-in.
With respect to the Molotov cocktail incident, Mr. Mescudi will say that he was rebuffing the defendant's attempts to talk to him after the break-in, and then there was this escalation. And the escalation, in terms of his car being lit on fire in his driveway, caused him to want to end this because he was concerned about where this could go.
I don't intend to elicit anything -- I do not think that it will come through the way maybe my notes from the meeting reflect last night. But there is no other context for why he had this meeting at the Soho House unless he is allowed to explain that I had this meeting because I was concerned with this pattern of activity. He will also say that there was no one else.
THE COURT: I understand that.
And, Mr. Steel, you heard what Ms. Johnson just said. I think what you're principally worried about is something further, which is that maybe what Ms. Johnson says now is fine, but when he gets on the stand he is going to go further and say, here, let me tell you what happened. He and his hired security staff, they went to my car, they put this thing in, they wanted to blow it up, etc., right?
MR. STEEL: Yes.
THE COURT: Let me just make sure that I'm correct, Ms. Johnson. It's not going to be that.
MS. JOHNSON: No.
THE COURT: It's not going to be that. If it starts getting into that, then I will stop it.
MR. STEEL: OK.
THE COURT: I understand what Mr. Steel is saying. You don't need to really go deep into that to understand the sequence of events. Mr. Steel doesn't object to the sequence of events, so that should get you most of the way there.
In terms of just understanding why he scheduled a meeting with Mr. Combs, I think he has to explain like why he did that. And then I think Mr. Steel is just saying, it can't be from that point to like an indictment of Mr. Combs and an explanation of what he thought, like all the things that he thought Mr. Combs did. That's fair.
But I'm hearing from you that's not going to happen, so I think we are good to go on that point.
Anything further?
MR. STEEL: If it's OK with this honorable Court, I gave to the government already, just in case it's easier and make it faster, I made two small booklets of cases, if he needs to be impeached or refresh his recollection.
THE COURT: Of course. Thank you for doing that.
MR. STEEL: Can I just approach now, so I don't have to do it when the next witness comes in --
THE COURT: Absolutely.
MR. STEEL: -- and give it to his honorable Court's courtroom deputy. And then when the witness comes on, it can go in front of him.
THE COURT: That's perfect.
MR. STEEL: Thank you, your Honor.
Anything further, Ms. Comey?
MS. COMEY: As to Mr. Kaplan, your Honor, I don't think we got your Honor's ruling on our hearsay objection to Defense Exhibit 402 and our 403 objection on Defense Exhibit 406. The 402 was the text exchange between Mr. Kaplan and Ms. Ventura during which she says: I am going to be in Boston. I am going to be on my own. And then she asks if he knows where she can find drugs. And we had had that hearsay objection to the first two statements.
THE COURT: That's fine.
As to Exhibit 406, that is admissible, including the message that precedes the photograph.
As to Exhibit 402, let me ask the defense -- I think the government's point is well taken that as to the statements that Ms. Ventura was in Boston and that she was on her own, those statements would be put in -- they go to the truth of the matter asserted. However, I didn't hear the government have any objection as to Ms. Ventura's request for drugs in Boston and then the response from Mr. Kaplan concerning getting those drugs. So there is no objection to that, so you can get that in. You can make any arguments you want based on the fact that Ms. Ventura was asking for those drugs independently, without Mr. Combs in the conversation.
MR. AGNIFILO: What I think I am going to do, Judge, just to hopefully make it easier, I'll ask him if he remembers the event. He probably won't. It's a very detailed specific thing. Assuming he says he doesn't remember it, I'll show him the chat to refresh his recollection. If he remembers it, I'll ask him about it. If he doesn't remember it, only then would I put in the part -- just so I'm clear, I see that your Honor, I think, is leaning a certain way, and I don't need to fight this battle.
THE COURT: I think like the last two pages of the exchange are not objected to. It's really the statements from Ms. Ventura that she was in Boston and that she was there on her own. And, by the way, it's not really clear whether Ms. Ventura was saying that she was on her own in Boston or was going to be on her own in New York City when she was going to be there. There are some issues with that part of the exchange.
MR. AGNIFILO: Let me see if I can do it the easy way, without putting it into evidence; and if I can, I will. If I have to put that portion into evidence, I will put that portion into evidence.
MS. COMEY: Finally, with respect to Mr. Kaplan, I failed to put this on the record the other day, but the parties conferred and agreed that Defense Exhibit 400 and 401 would not be offered because they contain double hearsay. So my understanding is they may be used to refresh or impeach, but they are not going to be offered.
MR. AGNIFILO: That's correct.
THE COURT: Very good.
MS. COMEY: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Let's have Mr. Kaplan back on the stand.
MS. COMEY: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Welcome back.
(Jury present)
THE COURT: Welcome back, members of the jury.
Mr. Kaplan, you understand you're still under oath.
GEORGE KAPLAN: I do.
THE COURT: Ms. Comey, you may proceed when ready.