UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ------------------------------x UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. 24 Cr. 542 (AS) SEAN COMBS, a/k/a "Puff Daddy," a/k/a "P. Diddy," a/k/a "Diddy," a/k/a "PD," a/k/a "Love," Defendant. Trial
New York, N.Y. May 28, 2025 8:38 a.m. Before: HON. ARUN SUBRAMANIAN, District Judge -and a Jury- APPEARANCES JAY CLAYTON United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York BY: MADISON R. SMYSER EMILY A. JOHNSON MAURENE R. COMEY MEREDITH FOSTER MITZI STEINER MARY C. SLAVIK Assistant United States Attorneys APPEARANCES
(Continued)
AGNIFILO INTRATER LLP Attorneys for Defendant BY: MARC A. AGNIFILO TENY R. GERAGOS -and- SHER TREMONTE BY: ANNA M. ESTEVAO -and- SHAPIRO ARATO BACH LLP BY: ALEXANDRA A.E. SHAPIRO JASON A. DRISCOLL -and- XAVIER R. DONALDSON BRIAN STEEL NICOLE WESTMORELAND ALSO PRESENT: LUCY GAVIN, AUSA Paralegal Specialist SHANNON BECKER, AUSA Paralegal Specialist RAYMOND MCLEOD, Defense Paralegal Specialist
(Trial resumed; jury not present)
THE COURT: First, on the motion to strike Mr. Mescudi's testimony, that motion is denied for the reasons stated in the government's May 28 letter.
Primarily, the two arguments that the court found persuasive were that, first, on cross-examination, the door was opened to the type of testimony that was elicited on redirect examination, and second, to the extent, as the court pointed out yesterday, the question was proper.
So the objection was overruled. To the extent that the defense believed that the answer elicited was an improper lay opinion, the time to raise that objection would have been contemporaneous with the answer being given. For the reason that, at that time, if the court could have stricken the testimony and permitted the government to reask the question or rephrase the question to elicit testimony that was not even arguably a lay opinion on the question of whether what was elicited was an improper lay opinion, the court finds persuasive the government's arguments concerning the context in which the testimony was offered and the circumstances surrounding the meeting at the Soho House and the meetings between Mr. Mescudi and Mr. Combs in the immediate timeframe preceding that meeting.
This was an instance in which the testimony, to the extent it could be construed as an opinion, was plainly based on the circumstances of the meeting and the interactions between Mr. Mescudi and Mr. Combs preceding the view being solicited, including the handshake and the testimony concerning that, that Mr. Mescudi offered without objection concerning the end of that meeting.
So the motion to strike is denied.
As to the prior consistent statement issue, just generally, because there is a lot of primary consistent statements that are being offered here. What is the response from the government on the fact that the Caracappa case, which is the principal authority cited, states in its discussion of the parameters of 801(d)(1)(B) that it is required that the opposing party be permitted an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant on the statements being offered. That's literally in the statement in Caracappa about what the rule requires.
What's the response to that argument which is not addressed in the government's letter?
MS. COMEY: So, your Honor, with respect to Mr. Nash, I think the answer is that the defense was on notice that Mr. Nash had received statements from Ms. Ventura about the fact that she was having sex with other men, and that she did not want to do so, in 3500 that was produced well before trial. And I think that includes 3500 from March of 2025, and the most recent before Ms. Ventura's testimony was on May 10 of 2025.
I think that those, that 3500 does not purport to provide a specific transcript. It does not purport to provide every single word that the witness said, but it certainly put the defense on notice that this witness was likely to testify about conversations that he had with Ms. Ventura about the fact that she was having sex with other men in front of the defendant, that he was recording it, and that she did not want to be doing that.
In particular, they were also on notice that Mr. Nash may testify about similar conversations during Ms. Ventura's 29th birthday. So they were on notice of all of that and could have cross-examined her about all of those particular statements --
THE COURT: Let me get this straight.
Having not elicited testimony on direct examination concerning particular statements, meaning, for instance, the statement from Ms. Ventura to Mr. Nash, you're saying on cross-examination the defense should elicit testimony concerning those statements that the government did not get into?
Doesn't that create a strange situation where the cross-examination is forced to address issues that they don't know whether the government is going to get into them or not, which are outside of the scope of direct examination?
MS. COMEY: So, I don't think so, your Honor. I think it would have been well within the scope of cross-examination.
During the direct, taking the 29th birthday first, Ms. Ventura on direct examination talked at some length about her 29th birthday, talked about Mr. Combs showing up, talked about how she didn't want to go, told him she did not want to do that on her birthday, talked about, I believe, who was at her birthday. And I don't understand there to be any requirement in Caracappa that we ask specifically, well, did you tell Deonte, did you tell your friends that, other than just asking her what she remembers from her 29th birthday and what she remembers happening.
I don't know if she would have remembered that statement. I think that with respect to the 29th birthday, the very least is sufficient, combined with the 3500 from Mr. Nash, to put the defense on notice that there is a witness a prior consistent statement.
So, for the 29th birthday, I think that that would be totally appropriate.
THE COURT: Did Ms. Ventura reference the statements to Mr. Nash?
MS. COMEY: No, your Honor.
In direct examination, she did not. I do not think she remembers them. I Think if she had been asked, do you remember having a conversation with Mr. Nash, I think she would have said no, I don't remember that.
THE COURT: All right. So I'm just reading from Caracappa. So within Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the prior consistent statement need not be proffered through the testimony of the declarant. This is the line that the government relies on.
MS. COMEY: Precisely, your Honor.
THE COURT: Further, where the declarant has already testified and the prior consistent statement is proffered through the testimony of another witness, the rules subject the cross-examination requirement is satisfied if the opposing party is not denied the opportunity to recall the declarant to the stand for cross-examination concerning the statement.
That's the completion of the Second Circuit's articulation of the standard. You would agree that's not satisfied, right?
MS. COMEY: I would agree that this witness cannot be recalled to the stand. I do believe that, again, as I thought we had discussed before with respect to prior consistent statements that we had offered in the past, if the defense was on notice that there was a prior consistent statement that might be offered from another witness, that the opportunity to cross-examine them would be available if they had received that 3500 material before Ms. Ventura's testimony. I thought we had that discussion.
THE COURT: We had a discussion with respect to a prior witness that, in that circumstance, neither --
I mean, Ms. Ventura is not subject to recall.
MS. COMEY: No, she's not.
THE COURT: In that instance, the 3500 material relating to the statement in question had been produced, like, that day.
MS. COMEY: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: It was very close in time.
MS. COMEY: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: With respect to Mr. Nash, the defense says the statements, at least as they are articulated in the government's letter, are not even in the 3500 material. That's a separate issue. But I'm not sure, reading Caracappa, that it's an independent basis to permit these statements coming in. And you've read the case. So they were both those issues that were addressed and they were addressed together, the witness was subject to recall and the statements were revealed in the 3500 material.
So it's hard to tell from Caracappa whether it would -- the court would have found it satisfied if Kaplan was not subject to recall.
MS. COMEY: I understand, your Honor. I think that this could be short-circuited, though, by the fact that all of statements we have proffered are also admissible to prove Ms. Ventura's state of mind. If we can focus on that, we don't need to spend more time --
THE COURT: You're not going to spend more time.
I'm not going to allow these statements to come in under the prior consistent statement rule for the reason that Ms. Ventura can't be recalled.
Let's focus on state of mind.
MS. COMEY: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: So, as for state of mind, let me ask the defense, because I don't think this is addressed in the response. Why wouldn't, at the very least, statements concerning Ms. Ventura's lack of desire to participate in freak-offs not fall within 803(3)?
Put aside whether Mr. Combs was making her do it and that coercion aspect, because I don't know if that falls within state of mind. But just the statement that Ms. Ventura, did she want to do these? No, she didn't want to do these.
That would seem to fall right within the rule, which says, a statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, such as motive, intent, or plan, or emotional sensory or physical condition, such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health.
So if we cut it off right there, and if the questions were just about whether Ms. Ventura told Mr. Nash that she did not want to participate in a freak-off that was happening right then, then wouldn't that fall within the rule?
Again, put to the side the stuff about Mr. Combs making her do it. OK.
MR. DONALDSON: Judge, I still think that it would have to be for its truth because that would be the only reason why it would be relevant for what they are trying to use it for.
THE COURT: It comes in for the truth if it falls within the exceptions.
MR. DONALDSON: I don't think it goes to --
I'm sorry. I don't think it goes directly to her state of mind as much as it goes to what someone else said. I don't know how Ms. Nash, saying what Cassie told her -- told him about that specific statement, goes towards what Cassie is thinking. I don't think it goes to that.
THE COURT: The government is going to ask it that way. I'm saying, on this view, if we cut it off right there, the questions from the government are going to be very focused on, you know, did Ms. -- I'm just giving an example -- did she say anything about the place she was going, the hotel she was going? Yes, she did. All right. Did she say she wanted to go to that hotel? No, she said she didn't want to go to the hotel.
Look at that, standing alone.
MR. DONALDSON: OK.
THE COURT: Why wouldn't that be state of mind testimony?
MR. DONALDSON: Did she say that she wanted to go to the hotel; yes or no?
I guess if it's looking backwards, maybe not. If she's answering a question about what she is about to do, I don't think that goes towards what she is thinking as much as what her actions are going to be. I would argue it's not towards her state of mind specifically, but more towards what she is trying to do at that time, not actually what she's thinking about doing.
So I don't think it goes to her state of mind.
THE COURT: I don't think that that argument is well taken in this context, but now let me turn back to the government.
MS. ESTEVAO: Can I add one point, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. ESTEVAO: I believe this also raises the same issue about our inability to recall Ms. Ventura to ask her questions about her state of mind at the time beyond she may have made this statement to Mr. Nash, if she made it at all, and about the foundational requirements for her state of mind at the time.
And this wasn't raised in the government's direct -- sorry, I'm not sure if I'm making that noise --
THE COURT: There's some problem with our microphones. We'll get it fixed.
Please.
MS. ESTEVAO: -- because this wasn't raised in the government's direct. I didn't have an opportunity to question Ms. Ventura about her state of mind at the time and why she may have made certain statements to Mr. Nash. And it may have to do with their relationship and what was going on at the time. There are a whole host of issues that only Ms. Ventura would be able to answer with respect to her state of mind at the time.
THE COURT: True. That is absolutely true.
However, it doesn't matter for purposes of Rule 803(3). It matters for the other rule, which I keep getting the number wrong, 801(d)(1)(B)
MS. ESTEVAO: But at a certain point, there are due process concerns that are raised as a result of this.
THE COURT: Understood.
All right. Now, the government heard my curtailing of the question.
MS. COMEY: I did, your Honor. So I think at this point throughout this trial, your Honor has allowed the defense to put in a wide variety of text messages and e-mails from a wide variety of declarants, including a poem at one point, all for the state of mind of the declarant. Not --
THE COURT: You can put in poems as well, if you would like to.
MS. COMEY: My point is, your Honor, that the court has had a very, very wide --
THE COURT: That's not convincing to me.
Explain to me -- this is the statement, OK. The statement, as I understand it from the letter, has two components. One is that Ms. Ventura did not want to do these things.
MS. COMEY: The second is that she felt that --
Well, she did not say she felt that. What she said is he's making me. I think the statement "he is making me" goes to her state of mind that she feels she has no choice. It goes to her state of mind that she feels she has to go, that she feels coerced. It goes directly to the core of the state of mind that we have to prove for Count Two. It goes to whether or not, in her mind, she felt like she had a choice and whether or not, in her mind, she felt like she could say no and whether or not, in her mind, she felt like she had to go even though she did not want to. It goes directly to her mind. Indeed, that's why we would be offering it. We would not be offering it --
THE COURT: What's the "it"?
MS. COMEY: The statement that he's making me go. He's making -- he's making me freak-off on my birthday. He's making me go to these hotels. We are offering it to prove that, in her mind, she felt coerced. That is the purpose of offering those statements, your Honor.
MR. DONALDSON: Judge, can I? Sorry.
THE COURT: All right. Fair enough.
Mr. Donaldson.
MR. DONALDSON: Just one last point, and I understood the court's distinction between Ms. Ventura not being available. I understand that, which is why we didn't talk about that.
But I think the government is -- the government is going to say what was her state of mind, and that is not what the rule is supposed to be for. So they are telling the court that they are going to hear what she said and then decide that what her state of mind was, was that she was coerced. That's not how it works.
As my colleague said earlier, I mean, if Ms. Ventura was able to say what her state of mind was based upon this statement, then fine. But the government should be able to say, well, he said, I want to make you go, so therefore that must mean she is thinking coercion.
They can't tell the jury what her state of mind is, which is what they are saying they are offering this evidence to do. They shouldn't be allowed to do that.
THE COURT: Well, hold on.
What the government is -- all they are doing is just eliciting the statements, so that is all they are doing. They are just saying that the statements only go to Ms. Ventura's state of mind. Like, no matter how you slice it, I tried to slice it, the government says, no matter how you slice it, Ms. Ventura is just saying what she was thinking at the time.
She is saying that she didn't want to do these things and she felt that she was made to. OK. So why wouldn't that go to state of mind, as opposed to some other impermissible purpose?
MR. DONALDSON: I don't think that, unless I'm --
THE COURT: I mean, I suppose -- I suppose the comeback is, well, her state of mind is just that she didn't want to do it and that she felt like she had to. The non-state of mind part of the statement is that it was the defendant who, through various means, if that is what she is going to testify about, made her, compelled her to do it. Because that's not her state of mind, that's actions by the defendant.
MR. DONALDSON: Right.
THE COURT: I don't know if those would come in under those statements.
MS. COMEY: No, your Honor.
All Mr. Nash will say is, He's making me freak-off on my birthday. That's the statement. It's not, He's beating me, he's blackmailing me, he's using these other methods. It's, He's making me freak-off on my birthday. He's making me go to this hotel. And that is reflective of her state of mind that she feels she has no choice. She feels she has to go. And this is the argument that we will make in summation to the jury from that statement.
THE COURT: And I guess the point is, like, other than the fact that it's him, as opposed to somebody else, but, of course, it is him because that's, like, that's who she is going to the hotel with.
MS. COMEY: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: The only actual substance to the statement is the making me.
MS. COMEY: Exactly, your Honor.
THE COURT: That goes to her state of mind.
MS. COMEY: Exactly, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
MS. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, I'm sorry. If I can just interject.
I think there is an additional problem here, which is that he's making me go. That could mean any number of things. A spouse may say, He's making me to go the Rangers game tonight. I don't want to go. I'm doing it to make him happy.
Without Ms. Ventura and the ability to cross-examine her about what she meant when she was doing it, whether she said that because she didn't want to do freak-offs at all and felt coerced or whether, on the other hand, as the defense has tried to argue and elicit testimony about, she loved Mr. Combs, she wanted to make him happy, and that was the main reason that -- or one of the reasons, at least, that she sometimes went to freak-offs, even if she made statements like that.
I think the problem here as a point of due process, among other things, is that there is no ability to cross- examine her on what she meant by that. And it could mean any number of things far short of coercion.
THE COURT: Well, if you're going back behind the rule to these due process principles, at that point, why wouldn't the government's response be you could have cross-examined Ms. Ventura about all of these things.
I'm looking at the 3500 material that is cited in your letter, and you give an example as to the 29th birthday. This statement is in there, that Ms. Ventura said that Mr. Combs was trying to ruin her birthday and was mad because she didn't want to freak off on my birthday, which is what I take it the government is going to elicit, that statement. And so there can't be any issue about not being able to confront Ms. Ventura with these statements because the defense had it and so they had this beforehand.
Now, the different situation with the prior consistent statement rule, the rule imposes certain requirements. But here, there is no rule-based requirement that the declarant be subject to cross-examination about the statement, and that's the distinction here.
MS. ESTEVAO: Your Honor, may I?
THE COURT: We have three people arguing, which is --
MR. DONALDSON: No, we don't.
THE COURT: -- which is fine for the moment, but we've got to, kind of, try to streamline these things.
MS. ESTEVAO: I apologize.
In preparing for Ms. Ventura's cross-examination, the amount of 3500 that was produced was so voluminous, there was no way that we could have fronted every single thing that was produced, that was mentioned in 3500, which was extreme.
So we relied on the government's direct in crafting our cross-examination because that's what the government chose to elicit. And I don't believe that this statement in particular was on the list of prior consistent statements that the government was seeking to elicit with Ms. Ventura.
THE COURT: To the extent that that was a real concern that the defense had, that the material was too voluminous and so they did not understand exactly which statements would be raised with particular witnesses, the time to have raised those types of arguments was in advance of trial.
Every day I'm getting these letters about broad-based issues, many of which should have been raised in the motion in limine phase and the court would have addressed it there. Every time an issue was raised prior to trial, we had a conference and we dealt with it and I imposed requirements on the government that I'm sure they were not really happy with in terms of disclosures and everything else. And we did that to try to make sure that, when we got to this phase, things were streamlined and there was proper notice, etc.
So if there was any sort of issue along those lines, the proper time to raise it is not after Ms. Ventura has left the stand. Now we have the other witnesses where the 3500 material shows these various issues. It would have been prior to trial, if the defendant had -- if the defense had any issue with going through these materials.
MS. ESTEVAO: Your Honor.
THE COURT: In any event, I'm going to think on the arguments that have been raised relevant to 803(3), and I'll let you know before Mr. Nash testifies on direct, which should happen after the break, right, given where we are?
MS. COMEY: I think, your Honor, he's likely to take the stand around 10:30 or 11:00.
If I may just respond to the due process point?
THE COURT: OK.
MS. COMEY: The points Ms. Shapiro made, I think, are all excellent points of cross-examination of Mr. Nash and for closing argument to the jury. They are not a basis to keep out where a proper foundation is laid, a statement that is offered for state of mind, which is what this is clearly offered for.
Again, it is narrowly directed at Ms. Ventura's state of mind with respect to coercion, which is an essential element of Count Two.
THE COURT: All right. We'll have a brief sidebar before Mr. Nash takes the stand so that the government understands what's going to happen here.
For present purposes, I'm going to make a tentative ruling, but I want to just think about it just for a little bit longer, to overrule the objection to those statements.
Now, Ms. Comey, they are all of this nature, right?
MS. COMEY: Exactly, your Honor.
THE COURT: There is nothing that falls outside of that?
MS. COMEY: They will all either be Ms. Ventura -- I think there is three separate vignettes -- and they are all either Ms. Ventura saying, I don't want to go to a hotel or, I don't want to be having sex with other men, and some version of, He's making me. Like, very, very tight, he's making me.
THE COURT: Are you putting on Mr. Nash?
MS. COMEY: I am, your Honor, yes.
THE COURT: All right. You're going to have to do that because one of the issues -- it hasn't been that pronounced, but there are sometimes, and it's unavoidable, where witnesses, because they may not appreciate the scope of the question, get outside of that.
MS. COMEY: I understand, your Honor.
THE COURT: So I'll trust that you will be monitoring and will try to constrain that.
MS. COMEY: I will, your Honor.
The way I have asked this question with him in prep has been: What do you remember her saying? And every time it has been no more, with respect to what Mr. Combs did, it's just, He's making me. Nothing more than that. And with respect to her own state of mind, it's some version of, I don't want to do this.
If I hear him start going astray beyond what he has said to me in the past, I will interrupt him and cut him off, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. What else do we need to address?
Because there's a lot in these letters, and the defense says that because the government's letter came in so late, they didn't address a lot of it.
So what are the other issues that need to be addressed for Mr. Nash?
I think we have Ignacio, Jiminez, and then we will have Mr. Nash.
MS. COMEY: So, for Mr. Nash, it's Defense Exhibits 1818 and 1820. There were two texts in each that the government objected to as hearsay. And there are similar objections to the objections that I raised with respect to a text exchange that the defense sought to put in with respect to Mr. Kaplan, where much of the text exchange is fine and not hearsay. There are statements buried within that appear offered to prove the truth.
And I don't know if we have those to pull up or if somebody has a paper copy.
MS. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, those were addressed in our letter this morning.
THE COURT: All right. So this is DX 1818.
MS. COMEY: Yes, your Honor. If I can pull up my copy.
Your Honor, if you're on 1818, my concern was the text from Ms. Ventura at the bottom of page one: About to go out of town for a couple of days. Getting my stuff together. And then her next text, Secret trip, LOL.
My reading of those is that the defense is offering them to prove that she was, in fact, going out of town for a couple of days and she was keeping that she was keeping that trip a secret. That, to me, seems like a statement that's offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
So that would be my objection, your Honor, similar to what I raised with Mr. Kaplan.
THE COURT: All right. Putting aside the fact that the expansive view of 803(3) taken by the defense to this exhibit sort of undermines their narrow construction of the rule with respect to the statements being elicited by the government.
What is the government's response on motive, intent, or plan, given that the nature of the conversation seems to indicate that this was a plan of Ms. Ventura's?
And so the defense cites to the text in the rule, as well as certain cases that indicate that statements of future intent and plan may be introduced to prove that the declarant thereafter acted in accordance with the stated intent.
MS. COMEY: I think that probably gets over the line for about to go out of town, your Honor. I don't know that it does for secret trip.
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection to DX 1818.
What about 1820?
MS. COMEY: 1820, the two text messages from Ms. Ventura at the bottom of page two appear to be stating that Mr. Combs is wasted, we both did the same of everything, but he's tripping. I think that means -- I believe they are offering that to prove that, in fact, Mr. Combs and Ms. Ventura did the same type of drugs and that Mr. Combs had a bad trip. So that appears to be offered for its truth.
Similarly, the two text messages from Ms. Ventura on the next page, I tried to stop him from embarrassing himself, but I can't, appeared to be offered to prove that she, in fact, tried to stop him from embarrassing himself and couldn't.
That would be my objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Why doesn't that, at least with respect to the observations of Mr. Combs being wasted, why doesn't that fall within 803(1) as a statement describing or explaining a condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived?
MS. COMEY: The fact that he's wasted might, your Honor. But the fact that they both did the same of everything, I think, would be offered for its truth and would not fall within that exception.
THE COURT: If, for instance, we both did the same of everything were redacted so it said, He's wasted, but he's tripping.
MS. COMEY: Yes, your Honor, I think that would be fine.
THE COURT: All right. Is there any issue from the defense with that redaction, or if not, what's the grounds to get in, We both did the same of everything?
MS. SHAPIRO: I mean, I think it's in the context of the same sentence. It's fairly incoherent without the context and, in fairness, it ought to be included. I mean, it's still, you know --
THE COURT: It's at 4:00 a.m., and the events in question happened in the preceding hours, is that correct?
MS. SHAPIRO: Well, this is during a freak-off that the government has put in evidence.
THE COURT: So it's during the freak-off.
MS. SHAPIRO: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection to 1820, even with regard to the statement that we both did the same of everything. It would seem to fall within the 803(1) exception for a statement describing or explaining an event made immediately after the declarant perceived it. And, obviously, Ms. Ventura, under those circumstances, had perceived the drug use immediately during the events in question. For that reason, the objection is overruled.
What else?
MS. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, just quickly, I'm not going to reargue the Mescudi ruling. I appreciate the court has made its decision. I do want to point out, going forward, with respect to the question that was asked, the reason the objection was valid wasn't the form of the question.
I think the problem here -- and that may recur, that's why I'm raising it now -- when the prosecutor asked, What was your understanding? It was clear that she knew his response was going to be Mr. Combs was lying, which the answer is improper for all the reasons that we explained under the case law.
I think it's inappropriate for the government to frame questions, you know, what was your understanding, in an attempt to make it seem like the form of the question is fine, when they know that the answer is going to elicit an improper lay opinion.
I would ask the court to at least direct the government to be more careful about that and make sure that they are not just disguising improper -- eliciting improper testimony under the guise of some question that sounds appropriate on its face.
THE COURT: Well, in this instance, as I noted, even if this were construed to be an opinion, the government's response is that it was rationally based on the witness's perception, given what had just been discussed concerning the meeting. Not only on direct examination, but also on cross-examination. It was all about what Mr. Mescudi had seen and the way he perceived Mr. Combs and all of that.
So that was the precursor to the testimony being offered. That's just on that issue.
MS. SHAPIRO: Well, your Honor, I mean --
THE COURT: The larger -- I don't know want to get sidetracked. I just wanted to address that.
On your larger question, the reason you address this, I agree with you that, you know, in some instances here, the questions that are coming out are, in terms of form, proper. But the defense is aware, because they have the 3500 material, as to what the response is going to be. And so it puts the defense in a tough spot, where the question may be proper, but they know that the answer that is going to be elicited may pose various issues.
This has come up from time to time, I agree, but I think the government needs to watch out, going forward, and make sure if they are running into one of these issues, they cabin the questions so we can avoid these issues or head them off at the pass before the answer is given, and then there is a motion to strike or an objection and I have to instruct the jury not to consider the witness's answer.
So I think it's a fair point.
MS. SHAPIRO: I appreciate that, your Honor. I do want to flag for the court, because I think the court may have a view of the 3500, that is what we would have hoped it would be. But, in reality, as a practical matter, it's not, which is that we don't always know what the witness is going to say. And, in fact, often the witnesses say things that are slightly different from the 3500. So we're not totally present just because we have a lot of 3500 material, so I just want to flag that.
THE COURT: Make your objections, but I'm watching.
So, to give a good example: Were you concerned that this was happening? Yes. Why were you concerned? That's, like, a chief example where it is known that the why question is going to open the floodgates to all sorts of potentially improper testimony.
To the extent that that is known, let's try to avoid it. There are other questions that can be asked that are more focused and that will navigate around any issue where there is an objection and we have to tell the jury to disregard testimony, so...
MS. SHAPIRO: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Let's try to do that moving forward.
Anything further with respect to Mr. Nash?
And, Ms. Johnson, you've been trying to get something...
MS. JOHNSON: Sorry. I'm doing that pop-up thing.
I do want to respond to Ms. Shapiro's accusations that the government is purposefully asking questions to elicit improper testimony.
That is certainly not the case. I don't think that we -- you know, as Ms. Shapiro has noted, witnesses say different things in our preparations with them than they sometimes say. There is some delta between the 3500 material and what they may say in a courtroom. We are not -- I did not know exactly how Mr. Mescudi would respond to that question.
So I just want to say that we are absolutely not intentionally eliciting impropr testimony.
THE COURT: Understood. Thank you.
Anything further from the government?
MS. COMEY: Not with respect to Mr. Nash, your Honor, no.
THE COURT: All right. Then the only outstanding issues are with respect to Mia, is that right? There's various evidentiary issues.
MS. SMYSER: That's right, your Honor.
THE COURT: OK. Is that something we can handle before or after the elongated lunch break?
MS. SMYSER: Yes. I don't expect her to take the stand until sometime after lunch.
THE COURT: Is there any further meeting and conferring necessary?
I'm trying to figure out in my mind whether it's something to handle at the beginning of the lunch break or whether the parties can use the additional time to narrow some of the objections.
MS. SMYSER: We may be able to speak some. I don't expect them to be narrowed much.
THE COURT: OK. All right. Very good.
So let's get our jury, and then we'll bring in our next witness.
MS. SLAVIK: Your Honor, may I take a place at the podium?
THE COURT: You may.
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(Jury present)
THE COURT: Please be seated. Welcome back, members of the jury.
The government may call its next witness.
MS. SLAVIK: The government calls Los Angeles Police Officer Christopher Ignacio.
COURT CLERK: Just remain standing for a moment and raise your right hand. CHRIS IGNACIO, called as a witness by the Government, having been duly sworn, testified as follows:
You may be seated. Can I ask you to just please give the court your first and last name and spell your first and last name into that microphone.
CHRIS IGNACIO: It's Chris Ignacio. C-h-r-i-s. I-g-n-a-c-i-o.
MS. SLAVIK: May I inquire, your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.